Lenihan: Fixing our broken politics

Originally posted on National Newswatch (available here)



Is politics broken? Yes, but we also know how to fix it. Through the ages, politics has been broken many times, yet people have risen to the challenge. The question now is whether we will do so again. Let’s start with a few examples before turning to the solution.
When King John signed the Magna Carta in 1215, he was under pressure from the barons, who felt politics was broken. To fix it, the king had to agree that even he was not above the law. The Rule of Law has since become the rock on which our political system rests.
Or consider the American and French Revolutions in the late 18th century. They were based on the idea that the source of government’s authority was not the king, but the people. The principle of the Sovereignty of the People rallied the people behind democracy.
During the Great Depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt proclaimed the New Deal, where government took on a new responsibility to provide relief and jobs for the unemployed. Today, the principle of Equality of Opportunity underpins a vast array of social programs, such as social assistance, education, unemployment insurance and healthcare.
These three periods were marked by profound social changes that made the political system of the day obsolete: politics was broken and it had to be fixed. In each case, the solution came through a new principle that placed new limits or responsibilities on the leaders.
History is at another turning point. The rise of digital technology has changed our society, vastly increasing the speed, complexity and interdependence of events; and turning the system of nation states into a global village. Huge amounts of data and information on everything imaginable—health, weather, traffic, trade, finances—are streaming through cyberspace.
The tools to organize and “scrape” this data are evolving daily. Statistics Canada reports that it can now get all the information it needs for the census by scraping 500 government databases, and at a fraction of the cost. Within a decade the census will be gone.
This is a sign of things to come. If content is now pouring from cyberspace like an open faucet, soon it will be gushing like a firehose. New “smart” devices of all kinds are getting plugged into the internet, from cars to lightbulbs.
By 2020, over 50 billion devices will be pulsing out data on their surroundings and their users. New artificial intelligence systems will supercharge the capacity to scrape, organize and use this data, radically advancing our knowledge of DNA, nanotechnology, the environment, the global economy, security, transportation, and so on.
This capacity to integrate Big Data from a range of sources marks the beginning of a new era in human knowledge. It could also vastly improve policymaking, if we use the data well. And that brings us to politics.
Last week, Samara Canada released its Democracy 360 report on the state of democracy at the federal level. Among other findings, fully 60% of Canadians now think MPs only want their vote, and only 40% of us trust them to do what is right. Another 39% say they haven’t had a single political conversation in the last year.
No one should be surprised. This is the logical result of a trend that began centralizing power in the Prime Minister’s Office under Pierre Trudeau. Today, the policy process is run out of the PMO. It is utterly lacking in transparency and parliament has been reduced to little more than a shell.
Of course people are cynical. They know where the real decisions are made and that public debate over them is a facade. That is why politics is broken and needs to be fixed. But how? As with the other examples from history, we need a principled way to reverse this trend.
There is a new principle that I believe can do this. It is called Open by Default and was formulated by the Open Government movement to guide governments around the world as they transform themselves for the digital age.
The principle turns conventional government thinking about data and information upside down. It declares that in the digital age they must be defined as a public asset. The role of governments is to act as stewards of this resource, rather than owners of it who are free to use it as they wish.
Under this principle, these assets must be openly available to the public, unless legitimate concerns, such as security or privacy, dictate otherwise. When they do, the rationale for confidentiality must be given and proper oversight ensured.
According to the Treasury Board Secretariat website, the Harper government now accepts this principle. I’ll return to this below. Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau also endorses Open by Default in his Private Members Bill on freedom of information.
But Open by Default is about more than data and information. It also applies to the dialogue and debate that is needed to put this asset to work in the service of better policymaking.
For example, it we want to map the issues around a community’s health needs, we must combine data on a range of factors, such as the environment, food consumption, education, exercise, income, cultural background, and so on.
This transforms the usual two-dimensional picture of a policy issue into a dynamic, three-dimensional model. Different combinations of factors produce different models and may lead to different conclusions.
Arriving at the best policies to solve issues on the environment, poverty, pipelines or national security thus is not simply science. Evidence-based decision-making is about exploring these options to make the choices that best meet our needs and aspirations as a community. It is a democratic exercise based on dialogue and debate that is open, informed, fair and inclusive.
So here is the deep question Open by Default raises for democratic process: Will this new approach to policymaking be conducted openly, with MPs, experts, officials and the public involved? Or carried out in secret by a coterie of analysts and then “sold” to the public?
This question has moved from pressing to urgent. For two decades, the public service has been building a vast new network of digital infrastructure to handle Big Data. Notwithstanding its alleged commitment to the principle of Open by Default, the Harper government has signaled its willingness to use its power to bring this infrastructure under its control.
Bill C-51, the anti-terrorism bill, will establish a massive new information-sharing regime to improve security, yet the government appears unwilling even to listen to arguments about new forms of oversight to monitor how the data is being used. For those who thought centralization couldn’t go any further, it has apparently entered a whole new phase.
The only way to fix politics is to reverse this centralizing trend. This will take a range of major reforms, both to parliament and the public service. And there will be cries and claims about the damage they will do to our system of government. Every age has its apologists for the status quo.
But to succeed, first and foremost, reformers must unite behind a single, clear and powerful idea of the kind of change we want to bring to our governments and why. That idea should be to put an end to government secrecy and to establish a new age of openness and evidence-based decision-making. It should be to make our governments Open by Default.

Once More Into the Breach

Download PDF

1. Introduction

The tabling of new, omnibus anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-51, in the Canadian Parliament in January 2015, has re-energized calls for greater “oversight” of Canadian intelligence and security practices. Many voices have weighed in, from former Canadian Prime Ministers, to the NSA whistleblower, Edward Snowden, who called out Canada for having one of the “weakest oversight” frameworks for intelligence gathering in the Western world.1 The concern is understandable. Not only are there significant legacy problems with our existing system of accountability, but the various new powers proposed in Bill C-51 are bound to impact greatly on security and intelligence practices. If the Bill is passed in its present form, a new information sharing regime within the Canadian government will be established; Canada’s ‘no fly’ list will be re-tooled; the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service [CSIS] will acquire a new “disruption” mandate; criminal offenses for the advocacy and promotion of terrorism will be added to the Criminal Code, expanding the national security law enforcement mandate of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Additional provisions for dismantling web sites deemed to support terrorism “propaganda” will inevitably involve the Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s signals intelligence and cyber security agency. Higher secrecy walls will be built around the use of security certificates under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. How all these measures will impact exactly is hard to determine without experience, but it is precisely in this unknown space, moving forward, that strong accountability needs to operate.
These new legislative powers, for which the Government aims to acquire Parliamentary approval before the summer recess, build on more than a decade of significant increases in the power, resources and capabilities of Canadian intelligence and security agencies. Major changes, post 9/11, to the agencies and departments that comprise the Canadian security and intelligence community have not been matched, to date, by any increased ability to scrutinize their activities. Indeed there has been some rollback, notably in the decision of the Harper government to abolish the function of the Inspector General of CSIS in 2012.
Now we are into a further expansion of powers, with a growing demand that a concomitant increase in accountability finally be afforded. Unusually, this demand has not been fueled by scandal, as has been the case in the past. Scandal was the root cause of the creation of Canada’s two principal review bodies, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), twinned at birth with CSIS in 1984, and the Commissioner for the Communications Security Establishment, created in 1996, and charged with a watchdog function over Canada’s electronic spy agency. It was the scandal of the Maher Arar affair that led to recommendations for reform of Canada’s accountability system in 2006 (recommendations which were not acted on).2 The current demand for greater accountability stems instead from legitimate concerns that Canada has reached a point of imbalance between measures to protect our security and measures to protect our basic rights. Because finding the right balance is so difficult in a world of changing threats and increased security powers conducted in an environment of secrecy, we look to systems of accountability as a check on abuses, as a restorative mechanism, and as a vital form of public reassurance.
Finally, and importantly, the public and political environment has changed. Canadians have experienced more than a decade of persistent terrorism-related security threats, culminating in two unfortunately successful, if small scale, terrorist attacks in October 2014. Current concerns about terrorism threats may now be at their highest level since the 9/11 attacks, stoked by a succession of terrorist attacks around the world, by concerns that Canada may truly be a target, as the Islamic State group has publicly proclaimed, and by the heated political debate around new anti-terrorism legislation. In the period since 9/11, Canadians have learned more about Canadian security and intelligence practices than has ever been the case in any previous era of Canadian history. Attention is being paid, including in unprecedented ways by both the traditional and new media, and with that attention has come an appetite for more—more knowledge, more information from government, more explanation, more transparency. The secret world now confronts a public demand for more openness, and into that breach stronger accountability must rush. There is no more ominous recipe for failure, both for operational performance and the maintenance of civil liberties, than if security and intelligence institutions lose public trust and legitimacy.
For all of these reasons: concerns about the potential loss of our ability to balance security needs and rights protections, fears of new powers and their unknowable usage, a fast changing security environment, heightened public awareness, and new demands for knowledge of state practices, we face an unusual moment of a crisis of confidence in the existing mechanisms of security and intelligence accountability. The crisis might pass, but the opportunity to fix an antiquated and wholly inadequate system of accountability should not be let slip.
The Canadian accountability system for intelligence and security was once widely touted as pioneering and impressive—once being in the 1980s and early 1990s. We even engaged in some quiet, behind-the-scenes, efforts to export our model of accountability to newly emerging democracies in places like Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. It is not far-fetched to imagine that we could return Canada to being a world leader among democracies when it comes to holding a burgeoning spy and security system to proper account, while letting them get on with doing their needful, lawful work to protect national security and contribute to international security.
To push in this hopeful direction, three things need to be established:

1) What purpose does accountability serve (or who benefits)?

2)What is wrong with the current system of accountability?

3)What changes are needed?

But first, a word about words. As many other commentators have noted (and political points have even been scored on this front), there is a great confusion around the terms used in this debate. “Oversight,” “review,” “accountability” are the major phrases of the art, sometimes used interchangeably in ways that are bound to create confusion. The most over-arching concept, and to my mind the preferable one, is “accountability.” Striving for accountability best represents what Canadians need from a system that scrutinizes the activities of our security and intelligence agencies from multiple perspectives and vantage points. Accountability contains elements of both oversight and review, an idea embraced by Justice O’Connor in his study of a new mechanism for scrutiny of the RCMP’s national security activities (Arar Inquiry, Part 2). Oversight in the professional lexicon means engagement with current and on-going intelligence and security activities. This professional definition (which captures how the intelligence committees of the US House and Senate operate) is at odds with a common sense one, that takes oversight to mean a capacity to scrutinize a security and intelligence system as a whole, from a strategic perspective. We can avoid this confusion by agreeing to talk about accountability instead. Accountability incorporates elements of “oversight” conducted in the Canadian, Westminster system by the executive branch, and of retrospective “review” conducted by external, independent agencies. It embraces internal measures within agencies, and external judicial controls. There is a place for an important role by Parliament in a system of accountability. Accountability represents the big picture objective of a system operating at numerous points of contact with, and scrutiny of, security and intelligence agencies.


2.Accountability for security and intelligence

Who Benefits?

In their public letter arguing for strengthening the accountability regime for Canada’s security and intelligence agencies, four former Canadian Prime Ministers, offered this succinct statement of purpose:

“A strong and robust accountability regime mitigates the risk of abuse, stops abuse when it is detected and provides a mechanism for remedying abuses that have taken place.”3

While this statement accords with Canadian practice and reflects the scandal driven context in which we have created elements of our accountability system in the past, I would argue that it is too narrowly constructed. The focus on abuses is an important part of the role of any democratic accountability system, and must remain a perennial feature. But to erect an elaborate system of accountability solely to catch abuses, while it might mirror public concerns, is insufficient. Accountability plays other, important roles both within the secret space of security and intelligence agencies, and in the public domain. Accountability systems are meant to provide support to internal cultures of lawfulness generated by leadership directives and training programs. It is in this internal cultural space that any abuses of law or government direction are best nipped in the bud. Accountability is also meant to assist in improved operational performance, in a wide variety of ways, including learning lessons from past operational or policy errors.
Accountability systems have to be acknowledged as a burden to security and intelligence agencies: they take time, attention, personnel resources away from purely operational matters. But they must not be seen as an unnecessary, unproductive burden. Too singular attention to abuses magnifies this problem. An understanding of the role of accountability in internal cultural and policy support and in performance improvements is vital. Most security and intelligence agencies know this, however reluctantly; but the public needs to know it as well.
The other important function of accountability operates in the public, political space. Here accountability offers more than a check on abuses. It also has the power to provide for public reassurance and public education. In an age when publics are rightly concerned both about threats to national security and about the enlarged, intrusive powers of security and intelligence agencies, accountability can offer an authoritative, independent source of information about the nature of threats, the nature of responses undertaken by security and intelligence agencies, about lawfulness issues and, on occasion, about the ultimate question of how well (or badly) our security and intelligence agencies are doing to provide for public security—what is sometimes referred to as the efficacy question. It can be a major contributor to sustaining public legitimacy around secret intelligence and security functions.
Accountability thus has multiple purposes and multiple audiences. It is meant to sustain lawfulness and contribute to successful performance. It is meant to speak in secret internally and to speak loudly in public. It has to manage these multiple audiences, and to find the right balance between internally directed messaging and messaging for public consumption.
Who benefits? In theory, everyone. Intelligence and security agencies benefit; government benefits; the public benefits. In practice, a major impediment to strengthening Canadian accountability is precisely the absence of recognition that everyone benefits. The root causes of this are a reluctance on the part of security and intelligence agencies to openly embrace accountability; a reluctance on the part of Government to see the benefits in contrast to seeing the costs of exposure and loss of informational control; an inability on the part of the public to truly grasp the value of accountability, largely because national security accountability mechanisms in Canada, particularly our existing review agencies, SIRC and the CSE Commissioner, have been so bad at addressing the public audience.

3.What is Wrong with the Current (Canadian) system of accountability?

The current Canadian system of accountability can be measured against many variables, but two in particular are on offer in the joint letter from our former Prime Ministers: robustness and integration. As their letter states:

“We all also share the view that the lack of a robust and integrated accountability regime for Canada’s nationals security agencies makes it difficult to meaningfully assess the efficacy and legality of Canada’s national security activities.”4

Robustness refers to the general capacity of the accountability system to see into those dark spaces of security and intelligence where it needs to peer (access) and to report appropriately. Integration refers to the ability of the different moving parts of an accountability system to work together–to be, in fact, a system. It has another meaning that looks outward to the scanning capacity of accountability.
To explore these problems further, it is helpful to distinguish between internal mechanisms for oversight, generally in the hands of agency heads, deputy ministers and Ministers, and external review mechanisms.
It is, admittedly, extremely difficult to pronounce on the adequacy of internal oversight in the Canadian system, as this is conducted largely out of sight. It would appear to be the case that internal cultures of lawfulness within security and intelligence agencies are currently sound and that agency leadership is strong. Deputy Ministers have a clear mandate to ensure lawfulness and efficacy of their portfolio agencies and “serve at pleasure.” Greater problems may exist at the Ministerial level, the pinnacle of internal oversight, in terms of the capacity of Ministers to perform their accountability function. This requires knowledge, engagement and clear direction and can sit uncomfortably with notions of the complexity and secrecy of national security operations, their necessary degrees of independence, the desire to avoid overt politicization and even the desire to have some degree of plausible deniability. Ministers engage too closely with national security agencies at their peril; they remain too distant and removed from national security agencies also at their peril. It’s a fine balancing act that needs constant adjustment and cannot stand alone.
There are documented hints that not all is well, including a recent 2013 study commissioned by the Department of National Defence on the review of Defence Intelligence activities, that argued:

“While the Minister of National Defence provides Ministerial direction to DND/CAF on the Government’s intelligence priorities each year, strategic direction for DI [Defence Intelligence] activities is otherwise weak, outdated or ad hoc.”5

Included in the Defence intelligence portfolio are the Communications Security Establishment and the Chief of Defence Intelligence, whose remit includes elements of counter-intelligence, security, threat assessment and overseas operational support.
Controversial Ministerial directives, from the Minister of Public Safety to CSIS, the RCMP and CBSA, on the handling of information and intelligence possibly derived from torture suggest that the Minister of Public Safety has been content to push decision-making authority on such matters down to the level of agency heads, or even managers within agencies.6
The most recent annual report (2013-14) from the Security and Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) argued that with respect to one (unnamed) CSIS “sensitive” activity that “The Minister of Public Safety is not always systematically advised of such activities, nor is he informed of them in a consistent manner.”7
These are worrying straws in the wind that suggest that Ministerial accountability may not be as robust as desired. This problem is compounded by the fact that Ministers do not have to account for national security activities to any dedicated, security cleared Parliamentary body and that substantial public Ministerial statements on national security matters are rare.
Ministerial accountability in the Canadian system also goes unexercised in the sense that Ministers do not currently have a Cabinet level forum for discussions on national security; a brief experiment in creating a Cabinet committee on National Security chaired by the Prime Minister was abandoned. Canada also lacks any mechanism for bringing key portfolio Ministers together with Deputies and agency heads to deal with national security emergencies or major policy discussions—a role played, for example, by the COBRA committee in the UK system.
Internal oversight in the Canadian system thus appears dependent on bureaucratic leadership and internal cultures, which can always be subject to change. Top-level oversight, conducted by Ministers, may be the weakest link.
The robustness of external review is another matter. The key external review bodies are the Security Intelligence Review Committee, with a mandate to scrutinize the activities of CSIS; and the CSE Commissioner, with a similar mandate to scrutinize the lawfulness of the Communications Security Establishment. SIRC was established in 1984 in the CSIS Act; the CSE Commissioner’s Office was first created by Order in Council in 1996. There are important differences in their construction, and some similarities. SIRC consists of a steering committee of part-time Privy Councillors (up to 5) appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation (which may be limited) with the Opposition parties. SIRC is supported by a small, full-time staff. The CSE Commissioner is a part-time retired judge, also supported by a small, full-time staff. There are currently no mandated requirements for knowledge of national security issues as a qualification for being a member of SIRC or being appointed as CSE Commissioner. Staff appointments to both bodies are non-transparent as are any appointments of persons on contract.
Access (to classified documents and officials) on the part of the review agencies is, in theory, guaranteed, short only of access to Cabinet confidences. In practice, access depends on a good working relationships between the review agency and the service being scrutinized. It depends on the expertise and persistence of the review body staff.8Struggles over access compound resource scarcities on the part of review bodies, leading to delays in reporting.
In any case, the existing review bodies are only capable of doing partial audits of national security activities on the basis of pre-approved review plans that are multi-year in nature and can sometimes fail to catch breaking issues or developing trends. Review agencies, it has to be accepted, will always be restricted to a partial audit function; the questions become how partial and how timely. Stickiness in relations between review agencies and their subjects, alongside significant resource constraints and possible expertise deficiencies, can tip partial audit away from its intended goal of producing meaningful national security scans, to mere unfinished ‘pointillism’—imagine canvases of scattered painted dots and brush strokes where no meaningful image ever coalesces.
The robustness of external review bodies is also affected by the fact that they are torn between two desired audiences for their reporting. One audience is the agency being scrutinized. Review agencies want their reports to be treated with respect, their recommendations (and they can only make recommendations), listened to and followed so as to improve lawfulness and even raise efficiency. This requires a close working relationship—a kind of closed loop of reporting, protected and shrouded by official secrecy. Such desired closeness can distort the critical faculties and independence of a review body. It can also lead to an over-valuing of the relationship between reviewer and reviewed at the expense of the review body’s public function.
The second audience for an external review agency is Parliament and the Canadian public. But in order to serve that audience, the review body has to step outside the ring of secrets, learn how to report declassified findings, and learn how to contribute to a public debate. This is more challenging than it might seem, and both of our external review agencies, SIRC and the CSE Commissioner, have struggled mightily over the years with public reporting, an especial problem for the CSE Commissioner. This on-going struggle to find ways to tell important national security stories in public without the deadweight of euphemistic language, the screen of obscurity, the excessive obeisance to official secrecy, has lowered the public legitimacy of these bodies to a dangerous extent.
In sum, the robustness of internal oversight may be compromised by weak Ministerial accountability and is subject to the vagaries of bureaucratic leadership and agency cultures. The robustness of external review is compromised by lack of resources and expertise, conflicts between reviewer and reviewed, by tensions pulling review bodies in different directions as they try to address different audiences for their reporting, and ultimately by lack of public standing.
If the current Canadian system clearly lacks robustness, as I have defined it; there is little to save it in terms of its integration. The meaning of integration cuts in two directions. One refers to the ability of elements of the accountability system to work together. Internal oversight is department and agency specific, with little overall coordination, especially in the absence of a Cabinet level standing committee or emergency body. The National Security Adviser can play a limited oversight role over the Canadian security and intelligence community as a whole but has to avoid delving into the details of individual agency and departmental issues. Justice Major’s Air India Inquiry report called for the strengthening of the powers of the National Security Adviser, but these recommendations were not accepted and would have required a significant re-engineering of the Canadian system with unclear payoffs.
The existing external review bodies, SIRC and the CSE Commissioner, represent siloed entities, with little capacity to coordinate their work, even in the face of increasingly integrated operations by national security agencies themselves. Their mandates limit them to the study of CSIS and CSE respectively, and nothing further. Beyond informal and limited exchanges between their professional staffs they cannot conduct joint inquiries. Justice O’Connor proposed in his Part 2 Arar Inquiry Study of national security review that statutory gateways should be constructed to allow for such coordination and joint inquiries, but the Government chose not to act on this recommendation.
Other external review agencies operate on the periphery of national security review, with only an occasional or tenuous foothold, owing to specialized mandates and sometimes lack of expertise and sufficient security-cleared staff. This is the case for the federal Privacy Commissioner, the Auditor General, and even the re-named Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP.
Even more striking than the lack of integration between existing external review bodies, is that fact that they are wholly inadequate to confront the reality of integrated and multi-faceted national security operations conducted by a wide range of agencies, many of which are not subject to any form of external review. The basic explanation for this is historical. The external review system was first created to deal with the then limited number of intelligence agencies with an operational capacity that included intrusive surveillance powers, and hence where abuse and scandal might lie—CSIS and CSE being the prime candidates. But the review system has not kept pace with the expansion of intelligence and security activities conducted by a wider range of agencies, some with intrusive operational mandates and powers.
One illustration of the gap between reviewed and non-reviewed government bodies can be found in the listing of entities to be included in the proposed national security information-sharing regime under Bill C-51. The list includes 17 entities, of which only only 3 (CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP) are subject to some form of independent, external review. The list of non-reviewed entities includes the Canada Border Services Agency, the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, the Department of Public Safety, and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). All have important intelligence and national security mandates and functions.
External review, to be effective, has to have the capacity to scrutinise the operations of the Canadian security and intelligence community as a whole, or if that is too ambitious, at least its key components. Our external review system is founded on an antiquated idea of what ‘key components’ means, and has been completely outstripped by the pace of change in the Canadian security and intelligence system since the 9/11 attacks and the many organisational changes that have followed in the Canadian governmental context. Since the 9/11 attacks we have seen the creation of the Department of Public Safety, the establishment of CBSA and FINTRAC, the growth of defence intelligence within DND/CAF, and the establishment of new security and information gathering functions, including the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP), by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. Too much of the Canadian security and intelligence system goes un-reviewed and this undermines confidence in the review of those few government agencies currently watched by external agencies. The review system is Swiss-cheese in nature.
Arguably the greatest gap in the Canadian system of accountability, when it comes to the ability to scrutinise the Canadian security and intelligence system as a whole, concerns Parliament. The size of this gap is far greater than many Canadians understand. There are currently standing committees of both the House of Commons (the Standing Committee of Public Safety and National Defence) and the Senate (Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence) whose mandates include issues of security and intelligence. But several things are worthy of note about the current committee system. One is that the mandates of both existing committees are very broad (including Defence) and not just focused on intelligence and security matters. The second is that the membership of these committees is chosen in the usual and obscure manner of jockeying among the parties and does not involve considerations of expertise on the part of MPs and Senators, which may help explain their frequent descent into partisanship. The third is that these committees have only minimal research expertise at hand, relying on assistance from the staff of the Library of Parliament. Their budgets are constrained. And if this list was not long enough, the biggest problem they face is that the MPs and Senators who sit on these committees are not security cleared, so they have no access to classified briefings and classified documents. These are committees seeking to understand the secret world without having access to the secret world.
As has often been pointed out, Canada stands apart from the practice of many of our close allies and partners, especially in the Five Eyes intelligence community, by not having any dedicated, security cleared Parliamentary body to engage in review of security and intelligence and intelligence community. Among Westminster style legislative bodies, The United Kingdom has its Intelligence and Security Committee, with a recently expanded mandate; Australia has its Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security; and tiny New Zealand punches above its weight with a Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. The United States has the mother of all legislative branch review systems, dating back to the 1970s, with separate committees of the House and Senate devoted exclusively to intelligence issues. There are many models out there to choose from and best practices to adapt to Canadian needs, but we have done none of this, despite sincere attempts including proposed Government legislation in the dying days of the Martin Liberals, which had all-party support, and despite subsequent private members bills and Senate motions to create such a body. The most recent effort, voted down at second reading by a Government majority in the House of Commons in September 2014 and not sent for Committee study, was the private member’s bill, C-622, by Joyce Murray, the Liberal defence critic. The Murray bill, which was two-part in nature, aimed at improving the accountability and transparency of CSE, as well as creating a committee of Parliament to scrutinise intelligence and security matters more broadly.
In Ms. Murray’s private members bill, the mandate of a proposed committee of Parliamentarians was described as three-fold:

1) Review the legislative, regulatory, policy and administrative framework for intelligence and national security in Canada

2) Review the activities of federal departments and agencies in relation to intelligence and national security; and

3) Report publicly on its activities, findings and recommendations

This mandate would have provided for what Craig Forcese and Kent Roach aptly describe as “pinnacle” review, of the sort missing not just in Parliament, but in all the external review mechanisms of the current accountability system. [vi]
To the extent that the value of Parliamentary review has not completely penetrated the Canadian Parliament, it is illustrative to turn to Australian commentary. Perhaps the most succinct argument for true Parliamentary accountability was provided recently by Australian Senator John Faulkner, a former Cabinet Minister who serves on the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Like Canada, Australia is trying to come to grips with new national security threats from terrorism and other sources and is expanding the legal powers of its security and intelligence agencies. Faulkner stated:

“The Australian Parliament’s responsibility is clear. It must ensure our intelligence and security agencies have the necessary powers and resources to protect Australian citizens and Australian interests. But these powers can impinge on the values and freedoms on which our democracy is founded—qualities which Australian citizens rightly expect Parliament to protect. So Parliament must strike a balance between our security imperatives and our liberties and freedoms. Key to achieving this balance is strong and effective accountability.”9

Would a new Parliamentary capacity be a magic solution to Canadian accountability gaps? The reasonable answer would have to be no. It would be part, an important part, of a broad based system of internal oversight and external review. But it could command the strategic heights. It would take time for the Committee to mature and gain the trust of both the security and intelligence community and the Canadian public. Qualifications for membership on the committee would have to be carefully considered. It would be a challenge for Parliament to set aside partisanship, as any such committee must. Its reporting would inevitably be hampered by official secrecy constraints. But should we worry that such a committee would simply disappear down the rabbit hole of secrecy, leading as Philippe Lagasse opined, simply to “ a select group of parliamentarians knowing more about national security affairs, but the public knowing, and perhaps caring, less”?10 The answer is no—based on both the experience of other established Parliamentary or legislative bodies among our close allies, and on the self-interest of Parliamentarians, and Parliament, itself.
The best that can be said, and it is something, is that accountability exists in the Canadian system. But it is wholly inadequate to the task of watching over a greatly enlarged sphere of security and intelligence operations conducted by a wider range of Canadian federal agencies, and fails to meet enhanced public fears around national security and expectations of transparency and debate and the guarding of public interest about such important issues.

4. Conclusion

What Needs to be Done?

The argument of this paper is that if we have a clear understanding of the purpose of accountability, a grasp of the current context of accountability in Canada, and of its historical roots, and a clear appreciation of the current and sizeable gaps in the system, then we have a roadmap for change. The new Rome of strengthened accountability won’t be built in a day, but we need to make a start. In fact a start has been made in terms of the heightened public and political debate around these issues.
The roadmap suggests that we need to focus our attention on four areas of change:

1.Improved Ministerial accountability (internal oversight)

2.Strengthened and broadened external review so as to capture under its watchful lens the full range of intelligence and security operations that are now being conducted by the Canadian government

3. The creation of a true Parliamentary capacity to review intelligence and security matters

4. Better public reporting by all components of the internal oversight and external review system

There are some solutions at hand to satisfy to satisfy many of these requirements for change. The argument can be made that we just need the political will and sense of urgency to implement them, starting with a more strategically focused and more wide-ranging expert external review body, often referred to as the “super SIRC” model, and with the establishment of a Parliamentary review capacity.
But we have to accept that the current Government believes that existing accountability mechanisms are adequate and has rejected arguments for change. In the context of the debate around C-51 the Government has, in particular, expressed a reliance on the Security and Intelligence Review Committee to police new CSIS powers, and on judicial “oversight” to ensure that Canadians’ rights are protected and the balance between security and rights are ensured. Judicial oversight exercised, for example, through scrutiny of warrant applications, the conditions imposed on peace bonds, controls on the use of preventative detention measures, and through the trial process (or judicial proceedings in the case of security certificates), is clearly very important to a system of accountability. But I would also, without going into the details here, second the concerns of legal experts such as Craig Forcese and Kent Roach that judicial oversight can never be complete, obviously does not reach the exercise of intelligence and law enforcement powers that fall beneath thresholds for judicial engagement, and contains no built-in requirements for on-going monitoring (or feedback loops).11 Judicial oversight, like SIRC review, is part of a system; if the overall system of accountability is weak, it cannot be saved by exaggerated reliance on individual components.
But if we are faced by political stalemate at the moment, as we appear to be, the question of what can be done slips ahead of what needs to be done. What can be done might take the form of minor and unsatisfactory changes, such as statutory gateways and more resources for existing external review bodies, to the overall accountability system. In that way what can be done might fool us into thinking we have solved the problem, or solved enough of it to allow it to be safely punted into the future.
My own preference would be to substitute further (purposeful) study for inaction or incomplete action, so as not to let slip the opportunities that currently exist to make headway on a problem that has (unusually) seized the political agenda and public imagination. I would argue for further, purposeful study, on two grounds. One would be that there exist a multiplicity of possible solutions to Canada’s accountability problems that warrant careful examination. There are best practices abroad that need careful scrutiny; there is a Canadian context and history that similarly needs careful attention. The other ground for further study is to avoid missing some important additions to accountability while in hot pursuit of the obvious changes (in which basket I would put a super SIRC and a Parliamentary capacity). As we consider changes to our accountability system, maybe with the idea of returning us to a leadership role among democracies, we need to consider such things as changes to the machinery of government for dealing with security and intelligence, greater application of outside expert knowledge on complex security threats and responses, (possibly though the re-constitution of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Council on National Security). We need to consider the requirement for greater transparency, without which accountability is hobbled. One measure would be a return to the practice of issuing a National Security Strategy on a regular basis. We need to consider adopting the practice of some of our close partners in terms of establishing an independent senior judicial authority to scrutinise the ever more complex and layered nature of national security legislation.
What would constitute purposeful study? Here are two suggestions. One would be a dedicated Parliamentary review of the matter, conducted by one or both of the House and Senate. The other would be the creation of an independent external body of experts to study the accountability waterfront. Both endeavours would have as their purpose the collection and analysis of evidence about accountability gaps and the practices of our close partners; both would reflect on public requirements for accountability; both would be charged with offering, within a reasonable time frame, concrete recommendations for change, to be presented as public reports to the Prime Minister and Parliament.
Further study is needed, further study would be beneficial, further study would capitalize on the opportunity of public attention. Further study can bridge, hopefully, the gap between the necessity for change and the current political stalemate. Even if our political system chose to consider further study as a form of punting a problem over the horizon that, too, would be OK. The issues aren’t going away. And an election is coming up, and, no doubt, another one after that.

Appendix

Wesley Wark,Visiting Professor,Graduate School of Public and International Affairs,University of Ottawa
Professor Wark is one of Canada’s leading experts on national security, intelligence and terrorism. He is a frequent contributor to the Canadian and international media and is currently working on two books dealing with the history and current practises of Canadian national security.

The Conservatives’ controversial case for war

First posted on CIPS Blog (available here)



The motion tabled in Parliament this week to extend Canada’s military engagement against the Islamic State (IS) sets a worrying precedent. The decision to expand the air war to Syria is grounded in a confused legality that blurs legitimate concerns with Iraq’s right to self-defence with the dubious legality of a global ‘war on terror’.
The motion and the various statements made by Prime Minister Harper and Defense Minister Kenney assert, in broad terms, three justifications for Canada’s military campaign against IS: the threat IS poses to Canada; the need for Canada to assist the government of Iraq in the defence of its people and territory; and the threat IS poses to civilians and religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq and Syria.
Of the three, only the second gives clear, international legal justification to the coalition campaign against IS.  Iraq is fully entitled to defend its territory against the IS incursions from Syria, or to battle Iraqi insurgents who have joined IS. In doing so, Iraq may invite nations, like Canada, to come to its aid, including pursuing IS forces in Syrian territory that is no longer controlled by the Syrian government. The case is even stronger because Syria has acquiesced in the face of US airstrikes on IS in Syria.
Given this reasonably sound legal basis for the Canadian military engagement against IS, in both Iraq and Syria, it is surprising and worrying that the Harper government also points to the threat that IS poses to Canada to justify its action. Sporadic terror attacks on Canadian soil are not the types of threat that, until now, Canada has argued give rise to a right to pre-emptively use military force in other countries to eliminate them. Yet the parliamentary motion specifically cites the fact that IS has called for attacks in Canada. And in citing the self-defence argument, both Harper and Kenney have said it refers to the defence of Iraqand Canada.
The broader self-defence argument is familiar – it has been cited by the United States for several years to justify its global war on Al-Qaeda (and the attacks on terrorist targets in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Pakistan and elsewhere). It is a controversial extension of the self-defence doctrine that few countries or international legal experts accept. So controversial in fact, that President Obama has limited it, noting that the US will endeavour to carry out these attacks with at least the tacit consent of the country concerned.
The reason is obvious. Many countries harbour foreign dissidents, rebels or exiles who are considered ‘terrorists’ by their home country, and who may be advocating or somehow inspiring or supporting attacks at home. The logic of the global war on terror would justify dozens of new wars – something that may soon be all too real as many countries acquire drone technology. Moreover, though posited as a military strategy, such attacks often resemble little more than targeted assassinations. Independent observers have concluded in several cases that US attacks in Yemen and Pakistan amount to extrajudicial executions.
But if they’re unnecessary, and poorly supported as a matter of law, why is the Harper government making these broader self-defense claims? There is no obvious answer. Some suggest it is just domestic politics. The Tories are hyping the IS threat to gain support, as they believe they are the party most Canadians trust on national security issues. Perhaps. But if so, it is a shortsighted approach. Many countries – indeed likely a large majority – will understand and accept that Canada chooses to assist Iraq to defend its territory. Yet, very few will agree with the idea that Canadian warplanes can attack IS in Syria because its leadership inspires violence against the west.
More worryingly, the broader self-defense claim may genuinely reflect the Prime Minister’s views – that Canada has a right to attack a terrorist group that threatens Canada, no matter where it is located. The Prime Minister has repeatedly spoken in recent weeks of the “international jihadist movement” and the threat it poses. It is an “evil” that must be confronted, not only in Iraq and Syria. Of course, there is no evidence to suggest the government actually intends to attack IS targets beyond Iraq and Syria. Further, the fact that Canada simply lacks the surveillance and military capacity to take the fight much further than the current engagement in Iraq and Syria suggests that a broader threat is not intended.
Nevertheless, there is some ambiguity in the parliamentary motion itself, especially when it refers to the need to attack “terrorists aligned with ISIL”. Presumably this means only in Iraq and Syria. There is an expanding number of IS franchises in Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East. What if they too start preaching violence against Canada? Words matter in international diplomacy, not least when war is at stake.
Finally, what of the last justification? Is Canadian military action against IS in Syria justified in order to prevent more IS atrocities against civilians and minorities? As a legal matter, a humanitarian intervention in Syria would require Security Council authorization. But as a practical matter, the argument is hard to sustain. There are many forces terrorizing civilians in Syria and Iraq, not least President Assad’s army and militias. Few would treat seriously a claim grounded in the protection of civilians that aims to eliminate only one murderous faction and in doing so arguably strengthens the others. The United Kingdom and other countries in the coalition have thus downplayed the humanitarian rationale and insisted military action was justified in the self-defense of Iraq. The US too has downplayed the humanitarian argument in making its legal case.
Canada could rely solely on the limited self-defence argument to justify the extension of its air war to IS targets in Syria. Of course, the success of the campaign is far from certain. In asserting, however, a broader right to respond militarily to terrorist threats abroad, Canada is signing up to a failing US strategy, of dubious legality, that despite hundreds of attacks in several countries, and over a decade, has manifestly not reduced the spread of Islamist militancy.

Crisis and opportunity: Time for a national infrastructure plan for Canada

This commentary is based on the Canada 2020 research paper ‘Crisis and Opportunity’



Infrastructure is central to every aspect of life in Canada. It’s a key driver of productivity and growth in a modern economy and it contributes to the health and well-being of Canadian citizens. It is a method for enabling communication and sharing of information between citizens. It is a means for providing core services such as water, electricity and energy and is a shaper of how our communities grow and contribute to our collective social fabric.
On a daily basis across the country, Canadians are impacted by infrastructure that has failed to be maintained or that has not been built. This can be partly attributed to a major shift in infrastructure ownership and financing over the past 50 years. In 1955, the federal government owned 44 percent of public infrastructure. Today, that number is less than five percent.
Municipalities own over 50 percent of public infrastructure, but collect only eight cents of every tax dollar. On the other hand, the federal government has 50 percent of Canada’s fiscal capacity, but contributes only 12 percent of our infrastructure fund. Experts have noted that the federal government should be spending approximately two percent of GDP on infrastructure to enhance prosperity and maintain a high quality of life. The current level of investment is 0.37 percent of GDP.
In 2013, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce estimated that Canada’s infrastructure deficit could be as high as $570 billion. I’m sure you experience this backlog of investment each day— from potholes that damage cars and act as safety hazards while cyling, to the overcapacity of public transit systems and lack of affordable housing options for Canadians. We have a lot of work to do.
Equally concerning is the fact that our existing infrastructure is not equipped to deal with the reality of climate change and extreme weather. Prior to 1996, only three natural disasters exceeded $500 million in damages. Since 1996, Canada has averaged one $500 million or larger disaster almost every year. On average, each natural disaster lowers GDP by approximately two percent.
In a paper I co-authored with Evergreen CityWorks Executive Director John Brodhead and economist Sean Mullin for Canada 2020, we called for urgent federal attention to this issue. Countries that exhibit best practices for infrastructure investment have decision-making frameworks driven by a strong central government committed to innovation and economic development. Within these frameworks, projects move forward based on multi-year forecasting and planning, establishing a platform for innovation, resiliency and prosperity. In Canada there has been an absence of a national infrastructure strategy and long decline of federal involvement in infrastructure spending has exacerbated Canada’s infrastructure deficit.
This challenge also represents a key opportunity for Canada’s federal government, as the economic benefits of investing in public infrastructure are substantial. David Dodge, former Governor of the Bank of Canada, has called on government to take advantage of the historically low interest rates as a way to provide badly needed stimulative effects in the economy in the short-term, and contribute to higher productivity and a more competitive economy in the long run. The current market conditions create a window of opportunity for decisive action by an active and committed federal government.
In the paper, we argue that it is time for the federal government to play a strong role in the planning and funding of public infrastructure in Canada. A critical starting point would be the creation of a long-term National Infrastructure Plan. We outline several components of what this plan could look like, but a central feature would be a comprehensive multi-year plan that would prioritize infrastructure projects across a number of areas of national significance. This feature would include a 10-year project pipeline prioritized by status, updated at least once a year on a rolling basis to reflect the movement of the projects in the pipeline and changes in strategy or emphasis.
A National Infrastructure Plan, respecting provincial and municipal jurisdiction, would coordinate infrastructure efforts across Canada, take advantage of the federal government’s fiscal capacity, create clear, transparent rules for infrastructure programs, enhance transparency of infrastructure planning and prioritization and share best practices across Canada. Only the federal government has the ability, authority and fiscal capacity to play this role within Canada.
The state of Canada’s infrastructure represents both a crisis and opportunity for our country. Only by taking decisive action now, can the federal government ensure we collectively seize the latter and avoid the former.



Jesse Darling is an Urban Project Designer at Evergreen CityWorks in Toronto.

Do truth and values (still) matter in politics?

This column first appeared in National Newswatch on March 17, 2015



During the debate over the niqab last week, I couldn’t help but think of Karl Rove, the renowned Republican strategist and spiritual mentor of the Harper government. The jury’s still out on what really happened, but I’d love to hear his take on it.
Karl Rove was George W Bush’s senior political advisor and campaign strategist. He may be one of the most influential figures in recent political history. He also had a huge impact on the Harper government.
Rove’s political philosophy can be summed up in three basic points.
First, much to his credit, he recognized the value of Big Data long before most strategists had even heard the term. Rove used the Republicans’ huge database to identity key groups of voters that could be specifically targeted to turn elections one way or another.
Second, he was brilliant at using wedge issues to split these groups off from larger cohorts in ways that advantaged Republicans.
Third, he was indifferent about whether positions held by the Republicans were true or false, right or wrong, as long as they garnered votes. Indeed, Rove had little use for policymakers who agonized over truth, evidence and values. He famously attacked the “reality-based community” for wasting its time trying to be objective.
In Rove’s view, perception is reality. Whoever controls the message gets to frame the issue, which, in turn, defines the public’s view of truth. So in politics, controlling the message is what really matters.
This was a revolutionary idea. Traditionally, political strategy was about striking the right balance between virtue and expediency, that is, between advancing the values a party stood for and making compromises to help it win power. Rove declared that politics was about winning, pure and simple.
This doesn’t mean that the Bush administration held no values or that its leaders disbelieved in truth. Rove and his allies in the White House thought it was their job to set goals that served the public interest. They just didn’t believe the public was up to playing a significant role in this.
They saw the public as an impulsive prisoner of emotion. The politicians’ job was to push the right buttons to get the right result. Rather than a search for solutions, public debate was a means to an end, a step in the policy process that had to be observed.
It was the agenda that really mattered. Implementing that justified using whatever means necessary to win the public debate, including lying to people, suppressing information, or employing wedge issues to divide one group against another.
Rove’s three points provide the philosophical rationale for the Bush administration’s infamous “Straussian doctrine,” according to which the truth was known inside the White House, but could not be shared with the public outside of it. The role of communications was to tell the public whatever story was necessary to get it to support the government’s plan.
If this all sounds familiar, it should. Rove’s fingerprints are all over the Harper PMO, from micro-targeting to the use of wedge issues to play one group off another. The gun registry, the crime agenda and the energy pipelines are all examples.
We can also include talking points, omnibus legislation, time allocation, committee interference, and media control in this bag of tricks. All are quintessential Rovian tactics.
And the abandonment of truth? Here too the Harper government has followed suit, showing a sometimes ruthless willingness to deny, discredit and even suppress evidence that conflicts with its positions. It has done so on crime and climate change, for example, and is now doing so on the new security law, C-51.
But last week may have been a turning point of some kind. The Harper government seemed to be taking this Rovian story-telling to a new level.
Many Canadians—including this writer—have doubts about the niqab and the burka and harbor suspicions about the cultural assumptions behind them.
With the assertion that the niqab is a symbol of an “anti-woman culture,” the prime minister seemed to be playing on this, trying to link fears over terrorism to individuals in our midst.
Having already stoked public fears about jihadis, this may have seemed to the government like the next logical step in its Rovian story on terrorism.
But when the three opposition leaders rose to challenge both him and Canadians to take a step back from our emotions and reflect on the nature of our political rights, a very un-Rovian thing happened.
Many commentators began arguing that Muslim women’s right to wear the niqab was more important than their feelings of suspicion and doubt.
In Rovian politics, this is not supposed to happen. The public isn’t supposed to be reflective and rational, especially when they’re scared.
Of course, these responses came mainly from members of the political class. I don’t know what would have happened if the debate had carried on. Would ordinary people also have risen to the occasion? I couldn’t help wondering what Rove would say.
The clear lesson from last week is that we have two very different views of politics in our country and they appear to be getting ready to square off.
One is optimistic about citizens and expansive about democracy. It is hopeful about people’s willingness to engage and to distinguish between truth and fiction, right and wrong.
The other is skeptical of the mob. It sees leadership as a secret society and communications and marketing as the appropriate surrogate for public debate.
One of these views of Canadians is right and one is wrong. We deserve an answer.

Trudeau on liberty

This column was first published on the National Newswatch website on March 11, 2015



What is it to be free? In a democracy like ours, there may be no more important question. Justin Trudeau gave a speech in Toronto on Monday night that engages this question with the seriousness it deserves.
Freedom, he tells us, is a core value that will “motivate (political) leaders’ decisions, whatever events may throw at them.” For Trudeau, liberty is the moral compass that guides our leaders and his speech is an impressive effort to spell out his views on it.
Stephen Harper also figures in the speech, cast as the chief architect of a competing view of freedom, one that Trudeau believes is taking hold in Canada today, and which he fears. To bring out the difference between the two versions, first we must spend a bit of time on the history of liberty.
Bear with me.
To be free is to be able to make choices, such as a career, a spouse or where to live. On this much, liberals and conservatives agree, but then they part company.
While conservatives are inclined to see freedom as the absence of restrictions, liberals believe it is more. After all, there may be no law preventing a poor person from becoming a doctor, but poor people are far less likely to become doctors than those born into privilege. So what does it really mean to say they are “free to become doctors”?
According to liberals, if all citizens are to enjoy their freedom, the right economic and social conditions must be in place to support them, such as food, shelter, education and medical care. Without these, freedom is often little more than an abstraction.
So for liberals, freedom is not something you either have or you don’t. It comes in degrees and stages; and it grows, changes and develops over time. To promote the growth of freedom, liberals endorse Equality of Opportunity. This allows governments to tax the wealthy so they can help the less fortunate develop the knowledge, skills and tools they need to exercise and enjoy their freedom.
Conservatives, on the other hand, believe it is wrong for the state to take away one person’s property to enable another. It violates their liberty.
This disagreement over liberty has been a constant tug-of-war between these two sides for almost a century. Yet, curiously, Trudeau says nothing about equality in his speech. Instead, he focuses on the role of community. What should we make of this?
Trudeau’s speech not only has a deep affinity with traditional liberal thinking on equality, it expands and deepens it in a way that makes it even more relevant for our century.
Much as 20th century liberals argued that education or heath care enables freedom, Trudeau believes that in the 21st century liberals must come to terms with a whole new category of enabling conditions: community participation. He explains this through two key ideas: inclusion and collective identity. Let’s start with inclusion.
Suppose a wave of immigrants arrive in a town where their customs, language and dress are different from the residents. Should the locals be expected to make adjustments to their lifestyle to accommodate the immigrants?
Many conservatives would see this as an infringement on their liberty, much like taxes. They would say it is wrong to ask the locals to give up their freedom to accommodate “outsiders.”
Trudeau sees things differently. For him, freedom is not a zero-sum game where a gain by one side is a loss for the other. Inclusiveness gradually expands the range of freedom within the society as a whole—and that is good for everyone.
For example, it challenges Canadians to see immigration as a two-way street where everyone should be open to new experiences and new choices. This, in turn, develops and deepens everyone’s understanding of freedom.
Collective identity, which is the second aspect of community, is like the flipside of inclusion. While inclusion is a way of expanding the boundaries of our experience, collective identity ensures these boundaries don’t just dissolve.
Liberty is meaningful only if the choices we are free to make reflect our sense of who we are and of what is important to us. Membership in a distinct social, cultural, ethnic or linguistic community is a critical part of meeting this identity condition and, as such, a key enabler of freedom that must be recognized and safeguarded.
In future, societies like Canada will become increasingly more diverse, not less. Striking the right balance between the “centripetal” force of collective identity and the “centrifugal” ones of inclusion will be among the most pressing and potentially stressful challenges facing democracies like ours.
For guidance, Trudeau believes Canadians should look to the Charter, which he sees as a key instrument to help us strike this balance. But while the Charter is central to this view of liberty, it is not enough to ensure it, which brings Trudeau to his third and final theme: political leadership.
He tells the story of a Muslim woman who recently appeared in a Quebec court. When the judge asked her to remove her headscarf, she refused on religious grounds. The judge, in turn, refused to hear her case, even though the federal court had confirmed a woman’s right to wear the hijab.
Trudeau was furious. But even more disconcerting, he notes, Harper has promised to appeal a ruling allowing women to cover their faces during the citizenship ceremony and that, on announcing this, went on to described Muslims’ refusal to remove the veil as “offensive.”
The anecdote is meant to bring out the difference between the two kinds of freedom, as well as the role of leadership in promoting them. Trudeau believes Harper sees diversity and difference as a threat to liberty, rather than an enabler of it. In Harper’s view, granting immigrants special freedoms will only diminish those of other Canadians.
Nor does Trudeau think Conservatives trust the courts and the Charter to help strike the right balance. But without the Charter and the courts to discipline politics, Trudeau fears Canadians could become hostage to a view of freedom that is inward-looking, reactionary and xenophobic. Indeed, he thinks this is already happening.
In response, he challenges us to see Canada through a very different lens—as a great experiment that is changing the rules of social organization. We are a “constitutional superpower” that is leading the world in the practice of liberty and we have been widely recognized and praised for it. The question we need to ask ourselves is whether we are really ready to give up on this now.
In the end, Trudeau’s view of liberty is very much in keeping with the liberal tradition he defends. Indeed, it can be traced back to the original triad of democratic values in the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Community).
As for the Charter, it is much more than a collection of rights and freedoms. It is a tool for aligning these three values within a single system of social organization. This achievement goes beyond the handful of Canadian First Ministers who created the Charter. It is a legacy of 250 years of hard work and often bitter experience from the liberal tradition.
Trudeau is simply trying to bring this learning fully into the 21st century.

If you give First Nations students the tools they need, they will succeed



The youngest and fastest growing segment of the Canadian population is underperforming academically to a dramatic degree. Nearly 40 per cent of indigenous Canadians do not graduate from high school, and the figure is nearly 60 per cent for First Nations people on reserves, rates that far exceed the Canadian average. What these statistics show is that the majority of First Nations students are not reaching their full potential and the question is why not?
The answer can be found in many areas, from extraordinarily high poverty levels to the underfunding of both healthcare and primary and secondary school education by the federal government. It was in this latter context that some of us enacted the Model School pilot project in September 2009.
Based on the very successful Turnaround Schools program developed by the Ontario government over a decade ago, the Model School project, known as Wiiji Kakendaasodaa: (Let’s All Learn Together) was a partnership between the Martin Aboriginal Education Initiative (MAEI), the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) at  the University of Toronto, the leadership of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation and Walpole Island First Nation, students, teachers and parents at the two host schools: Hillside School and Walpole Island Elementary School.
The project taught teachers new teaching methods, raised expectations for students and introduced a mandatory 90 minutes of daily reading and writing instruction. The results, announced in Toronto a few weeks ago were nothing short of outstanding.
Before the program began, 13 per cent of First Nations students at the two participating schools reached the provincial standard on Grade 3 reading tests, and 33 per cent met the provincial standard in writing. In Grade 6, 17% of students met the provincial reading standard and 39% of Grade 6 students met the provincial writing standard.
After implementing new teaching methods in the Model School Project, almost 70 per cent of Grade 3 students achieved the reading provincial standard and more than 90 per cent hit Ontario’s writing provincial standard, which surpassed the provincial average. In Grade 6, 72% of students met both the reading and writing provincial standard.
Also of particular note was the fact that the percentage of students identified as having special needs greatly decreased. During Wiiji Kakendaasodaa, the percentage of students identified for special education services decreased from 45% to 19% in Senior Kindergarten to Grade 3; the percentage decreased from 24% to 4% in Grades 4 to 6.
These results provide irrefutable evidence that First Nations students can and will succeed if given the opportunity. For this reason the project should be replicated in every First Nations community where it is needed across this country.
Teaching literacy is a moral obligation. It is also essential to harnessing the economic potential of Canada for Indigenous children, who represent the youngest and fastest growing segment of our population.
What should be done? The Government of Canada should act. Proper funding will make the difference. The proof is here.
To see the full report: http://www.maei-ieam.ca/pdf/Model-School-Feb%2022.pdf

Blog: Building Ottawa (and Canada) through healthy babies and healthy children



In the draft budget for 2015 tabled by the City of Ottawa, one seemingly small but critical program is at risk: Healthy Babies Healthy Children. Launched by the province of Ontario and run by the Ottawa Board of Health, it is program on the proverbial chopping block that is worthy of national attention.
The early years – from birth to age six – are critical in a child’s development. Healthy Babies Healthy Children helps to support pre-natal and post-natal care for all citizens in the city. Three avenues of programs and services provide this support.
First, to help parents learn about pregnancy, preterm labour, breastfeeding, and caring for an infant, free online and in person prental classes are offered in English and French in various locations across the City throughout the year.  In addition, public health officials facilitate ‘pregnancy circles’ that are offered in English, French, and Chinese, for expectant parents who may need extra support.
Second, after a baby is born in Ottawa, a public health nurse calls to check in on the health of the newborn. Asking fundamental questions, these simple phone calls connect parents to the outside world at a time of vulnerability and uncertainty. It lets families know that they are not alone and that there is someone out there that they can call if need be.
Third, drop-in centres are open on a rotating basis every day of the week all across the city. Facilitated by public health nurses, nutritionists and lactation consultants, the centres provide a safe and warm environment for parents with young infants to visit. Here, babies are weighed, ‘tummy-times’ are had, and communities are built. Moms having problems with breastfeeding can learn new tricks to make it easier for them, parents worried about the development of their babies can have questions answered, nurses are given face-to-face opportunities to explain the benefits of vaccines (all the more important given the recent measles outbreak), and everyone gets to share their stories about the joys and challenges they are facing with young infants at home.
Individual benefits for babies from such programs are clear. While nothing really prepares you for bringing a baby home, prental classes nevertheless give parents good information to increase infant well-being. Regular weekly weigh-ins that is charted provides early warning signs if something is wrong. Or, weekly weigh-ins may calm nervous young parents keeping them out of doctors’ offices. Even as early as three months, contact with other babies furthers cognitive and emotional development. Such individual benefits for the babies should be enough to convince any government to keep these programs running.
Benefits, however, are not restricted to the individual babies. Collective benefits for families and the community writ large are invaluable.
Post-partum depression, for example, is a major illness that can affect moms, dads, and parents who adopt [1]. Caring for an infant is often extremely isolating, amplifying the symptoms of post-partum depression. Having a safe space to visit and regularly meet with other people can help parents see if they are experiencing the symptoms of post-partum depression and seek the help that they need.
Ottawa, like many cities across Canada, is also filled with families that have just moved who don’t have access to an extended network of aunts, uncles, and grandparents that they can rely on. The drop-in centres held under the Healthy Babies Healthy Children program help build communities. From clothing exchanges to informal parental baby-sitting networks, these centres provide a hub for new residents helping them to integrate into the place that they are now calling home.
That, in a nutshell, is the Healthy Babies Healthy Children program and some of the key benefits that it offers. What, then, is the problem?
In her report submitted to the City, Medical Officer of Health, Dr. Isra Levy draws attention to the fact that Ottawa Public Health faces ‘significant long-term funding shortfalls’ caused by inflation and insufficient support from the Government of Ontario due to caps on provincially funded programs [2]. A funding gap has thus appeared.
To fill the gap, Ottawa Public Health is planning to restrict access to the three avenues of service for clients with ‘identified risk factors’. In other words, a program that was once open and available for all families in the city will now be limited to only those who meet defined criteria.
If the City does this, a universal program will be transformed into what policy wonks call a means-tested service. A poor strategy for two reasons.
First, restricting the program to ‘at-risk’ clients will increase the administrative costs of the programs. Staff members will now need to spend time determining whether or not a person should actually access the service, rather than simply working with everyone who comes through the proverbial door.
Second, universal programs help build solidarity and foster shared understanding. Such programs also have a greater number of people concerned that are ready and willing to fight for them should they be threatened with cuts or cancellation. When services are means tested, such advocates disappear and, overtime, the benefits are at a bigger risk of withering or vanishing altogether.
Contrast this proposal with a long-standing practice in Finland. There, for more than 75 years, expectant mothers are given a box by the state. With clothes, sheets and toys it gives all Finnish children, regardless of their background, the same start in life.  And, according to researchers like Mika Gissler, professor at the National Institute for Health and Welfare in Helsinki, the boxes have played a major role in improving family health overall in the country [3].
So what should happen? To start, the Province of Ontario should index the funds to ensure the costs of the programs it launched are sufficiently covered. Ironically, Ontario is subjecting municipalities across the province to the same critique often lobbed at the federal government: the province started a ‘boutique program’ while leaving the other level of government holding the financial bag. The City of Ottawa could be a bellwether for other municipalities across the province, and the entire initiative may be on route to its demise.
Even more importantly, particularly given Canada’s egregious and stubborn rates of child poverty, provinces and territories from coast to coast should offer similar programs and improve on the Ontario model [4].  An integrated yet diversified network of such programs dedicated to young children should be established and made available and accessible for all families regardless of where they live in the country. Healthy babies and healthy children should be a benefit enjoyed by all who live in Canada.

Jennifer Wallner is an Assistant Professor at the University of Ottawa’s School of Political Studies. She can be contacted at jennifer.wallner[at]uottawa.ca