Remarks: A non-partisan path forward

Remarks from Michael Wernick to the Canada 2020 4th Annual Indigenous Economic Development Forum

November 27, 2019 (The Westin Ottawa)

Kwe Kwe, Tan’si, Ullakuut, Bouzhou, Bonjour and Good Morning.

Let me also begin by acknowledging that we are gathered on the traditional territories of the Algonquin peoples of this part of Turtle Island, and by thanking Elder Venra who helped us get today’s gathering started in the right way.

I also want to thank Canada 2020 for the invitation to join today’s dialogue, and acknowledge the many wonderful speakers and panellists gathered here today, many of whom I have had the honour to meet along the path I have taken. 

The diversity of Canada’s Indigenous peoples, their history and their present realities, is such that it is rare that any statement holds true for all. Rather it is weaving or braiding those diverse experiences and realities together that brings us closer to finding common ground and a way forward.  That is the great service Canada 2020 is providing to us today.

All I can offer in the next few minutes is to share, with great humility, some reflections from my own journey, suggest where that common ground may be found, and propose a menu of specific actions that could be taken. My contention is that we have an opportunity right now for a non-partisan agenda that would make a tangible difference.

My own journey with Indigenous issues began in 1985, as the desk officer at the Department of Finance for Indian and Northern Affairs, and for the next 34 years I returned many times to the path of Indigenous issues, always as a servant of the Crown, always in the executive branch of the federal government.  Half of my career I worked for red governments and half of it for blue.

Pulling together the biography you have in front of you, that traces my journey it jumped off the page that along the way there were some big setbacks, when exciting breakthroughs stumbled and collapsed at the last step, disappointing not just the government of the day – but also the Indigenous leaders who had taken great risk to work collaboratively rather than sit back and reject. 

The 1987 Constitutional Conference chaired by PM Mulroney, the Charlottetown Accord, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and the Gathering Strength response, the Kelowna Accord, the First Nations Education Act, the First Nations Governance Act.  These events have reinforced a view I often heard, and still do, in some circles of punditry and politics that Indigenous issues are intractable, and that the career of every Minister and every National Chief will ultimately end badly.  

I reject that view.  Along the way there have also been important breakthroughs. The entrenchment of constitutional protections in sections 25 and 35 of our Constitution just one generation ago (I was in the crowd on the Hill that rainy day in April) has changed the power balance and opened up a path that runs not through legislatures but through the courts. More than 20 Supreme Court rulings have established a body of law and principles such as Honour of the Crown, duty to consult, duty to diligently implement, and concepts of Aboriginal title and Metis rights that have real impact. The law has created leverage and opportunity for Indigenous peoples here in Canada that no other Indigenous peoples in settler countries have achieved.  

In particular the 26 modern treaties addressing land claims or self government or both have given communities and people meaningful tools to regain a degree of sovereignty and build a better future.

I especially want to lift up the Inuit leaders, past and present, who have built something unique in the world over the past 20 years, and the Yukon First Nations who left the Indian Act and achieved self government a generation ago.

These agreements, as well as dozens of litigation settlements, were in part intended to address some of the most egregious wounds created by our troubled history, which was a key recommendation of the Royal Commission in 1996.  In some ways they can never be enough, but by acknowledging and facing up to the past they have allowed at least some healing and freed up energy and effort toward shaping the future.  Among them I would note the residential schools settlement and more recent settlements related to childhood experiences, the apologies for forced relocations, the settlements of the Lubicon and Bigstone Cree claims, the creation of the Qalipu First Nation, the Paix des Braves in Quebec.  

This is not to overlook the flaws and imperfections in how many of these initiatives have been implemented, or to deny that there is so, so much more left to do. 

I do contend they illustrate that with good will, mutual respect and courage, common ground can be found and progress achieved  – but also that the quest for the perfect and pure can be the enemy of the good and may needlessly prolong misery.

Each success creates hope and momentum, and concrete lessons that can carry forward to new successes. Emulating and spreading success stories is often the most effective approach to creating positive change in the world.

Our history tells us that there is no reason for Indigenous issues to be caught up in divisive party partisanship.  Each of the eight Prime Ministers and ten Ministers I have served – yes I started and ended with a Trudeau – has in his or her own way attempted with personal commitment and at some political cost to tackle the profound challenges of what we now call reconciliation and each has seen achievements and setbacks along the way.  I can also say have seen the best and the worst from provincial governments of all stripes, red, blue and orange.

So my assertion is that there is ample room right now for a non-partisan or multi-partisan agenda here in Ottawa, and indeed an urgent need for an intergovernmental agenda bringing together all governments in our federation. 

Given the high failure rate of grand scale broad spectrum political initiatives like the Charlottetown and Kelowna Accords, and of some of the more targeted structural reforms, it seems to me that the best approach is one of relentless step by step change, working together, and that a good place to start in 2020 is in fact economic reconciliation.  

Whether you come from the red, blue or orange camps in national politics, or from the pragmatist or ideologue camps in Indigenous politics, from the public or private sector, no one wants a future of poverty, unemployment and dependency. There are many good practices and ideas we can quickly build on, especially if we speak directly and honestly with each other.

To paraphrase someone I admire who spoke to Canada 2020 earlier this year – there are no blue ideas or red ideas or orange ideas  – just ideas, good and bad.

I don’t think it has anything to do with majority or minority government: many of the big initiatives that failed in the past were initiated by majority governments and some important successes were achieved by minority governments.

I do think it has to do with common ground. I can see at least five areas on which to build.

The first point of common ground should be to say more often to each other that there can be no broad progress in any community anywhere on social, health and justice outcomes if there is no economy.  People want a degree of personal autonomy, they want jobs and opportunity to build something for themselves and a future for their families, whether it is a career, a home, a retirement nestegg, or a business. 

Communities need an economy that will generate revenues to pay for services and that can be monetized to finance infrastructure.  The government in self-government means collecting revenues and accounting for their use, not dependency on transfers. 

The second point of common ground, conversely, should be that in 2020 economic growth must be sustainable and must be inclusive.  Indigenous peoples knew this before the rest of us began to catch on and catch up. We must ensure economic and infrastructure projects in and near Indigenous communities are held to the highest standards of environmental impact and that these communities are leading, not following, the great energy shift under way.

I would add under the social dimension of sustainability that we must be vigilant not to see the historic inequality between indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians morph into a new form of inequality among Indigenous Canadians.

Third, and this may be contentious for some, we know that economic outcomes are hugely affected by the quality of governance. I am a big fan of the 2012 book Why Nations Fail and the compelling case it makes for inclusive governance.  We must chart a course where we do not end up with everyone working for Indigenous governments and their state owned businesses, but nor do we end up with unaccountable oligarchs. 

Fourth, the ingredients of activating economic growth and activity are the same for everyone – land and resources, location, access to supply chains and markets, access to start up and patient capital, people and their skills and talents, and a blend of innovation and entrepeneurship.  Indigenous economies are not exempt from the principles of economics.

Fifth, there is no single economic growth strategy or toolkit that will work for all Indigenous peoples.  We have to be moving on all fronts. There will have to be very specific approaches for Inuit and Metis and we will have to pay much greater attention to the half of Indigenous people who come to study, work and live in non-Indigenous communities but often have profound ties, including voting rights, in their home communities.

The good news is that there is a diversity of opportunity spreading into new sectors and industries –  natural resource extraction and processing, ecotourism cultural tourism, cultural creation, clean energy, broadband infrastructure, selling into procurement supply chains, environmental monitoring, air and bus transportation of people, use of drones for surveying or wildlife monitoring, shipping and logistics, introducing airships and hoverbarges to replace failing ice roads, cleaning up orphan wells and contaminated sites, removing old munitions, greening of military bases, building and maintaining housing and community infrastructure, hosting data and server farms in secure locations, selling directly into Amazon and Alibaba.

We know that for many communities despite the opportunities there are all too many obstacles and impediments in the way.  Location, scale, lack of capital, lack of skilled labour, lack of reliable infrastructure, lack of broadband – these are still all too common and require focus and effort.

We also know that some key obstacles are created by the unique legal underpinnings of most Indigenous communities.  As short as that path would be, and perhaps it is worth a shot, I do not think we will ever see consensus for a simple one page bill that says “the Indian Act, 1951 is repealed, effective five years from Royal Assent”.  Because there is not going to be an easy consensus about what will follow, not just in Parliament, but in Indigenous politics. What happens after exit?

Since the big breakthrough in 1982 all of the subsequent constitutional rounds failed. We have only managed two exit strategies to date. One road is the modern treaty. The other is the workarounds that are optional, not mandatory. Many in this room will be familiar with at least one of them (though perhaps by acronym): the First Nations Land Management Act, the First Nations Oil and Gas Act, the First Nations Commercial and Industrial Development Act, the First Nations Fiscal Management Act and its creations the First Nations Tax Commission and the First Nations Financial Authority. 

However, If we are candid, most First Nations leaders in fact want to retain three essential legal features of the Indian Act – inalienable communal land, shielding from provincial laws of general application, and exemption from taxation of income earned on reserve.  

That is understandable, but it does mean there is no simple version of a successor regime, and it will mean extra work to create winning conditions for economic activity.  The good news is that this is quite achievable.  I personally think there is a potential third exit strategy – of updating the historic treaties with new constitutionally protected side agreements and implementation agreements – but that is a big topic for another conference another day.

My own view has long been that the way to get rid of the Indian Act is the Jenga strategy – you know the game where you have a pile of logs and you pull one out, the another, then another until eventually the structure just collapses.  If we pull more communities out one by one by concluding modern treaties and increasing take up of tools like the First Nations Land Management Act, and if we pull out just a few more pieces of the Indian Act regime, we get closer to the day when it comes crashing down.  Perhaps we are closer than we know.

So I want to close by putting forward some very specific initiatives, that would move us forward. My focus is on creating economic activity, and I am setting aside for now some other important aspects of our broader reconciliation journey. I speak for no-one but myself.  Here are twelve specific things we can do.

  1. to Premiers Kenney, Moe and Pallister – uncertainty about Aboriginal title is pulling back economic growth in your provinces. So let’s clarify who owns what across the West and let’s expand the Indigenous land base to its rightful dimensions.  Premier Kenney gave a really important speech to the Peter Lougheed dinner last week and spoke of a can-do, get it done Western sprit.  So, why not work with your two colleagues and sign a pledge right now to complete, within the next five years, the Treaty Land Entitlements that were promised more than a century ago.  To paraphrase the late Gord Downie – we are behind by a century.  Your governments control most of the Crown Land. and you own the natural resources.  Don’t hide behind the federal government. 
  2. to the same three Prairie Premiers I would also say – it is time to stop kicking the can down the road of Metis claims and hiding behind the courts. The Metis have been here a long time, they are recognized in the Constitution, and they aren’t going anywhere.  Let’s start by convening a Summit in 2020 bringing together the three Premiers, the Prime Minister and the Metis Nation and then keep at it.
  3. to all Premiers – you jealously guard jurisdiction over securities markets and incorporation – so you could make it a filing requirement that a company above a certain size can’t be listed on the stock exchange, unless it has published publicly its plan for economic reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and updates it every year.
  4. to both the federal and provincial governments who procure billions of dollars of goods and services – the tools you now use for Indigenous participation sound good but in practice they are puny and underpowered – table scraps for small business – it is time to take the more successful American models used there since the 1970s, and put in place much more robust and ambitious procurement levers.  They should look more like the best in class benefit agreements with a focus on real reportable and binding commitments to training and employment of young people.
  5. how about closing the next First Ministers Conference by signing a pledge to work together and get every single Indigenous community on good quality broadband within five years. And not just one computer in the band office or school – real connection for students in their own homes and for businesses to join the world of digital commerce.
  6. to the federal government, commit that within five years you will turn over all the funds collected as “Indian Moneys” to First Nations Governments or trust funds run by First Nations. Pass a one page bill now to repeal the Indian Moneys sections of the Indian Act five years from Royal Assent. That will create some urgency and inject several hundred million dollars of working capital and pull one more log out of the tower. Google Allan Clarke’s paper in Policy Options on this one, or go and see him. He is here today.
  7. Bear with me, but in practice there is an impediment to securing insurance and financing, a deterrent to investment, and a source of disputes about cleanup because of perceived legal uncertainty about who owns the infrastructure grids, buildings and houses on reserves – the band or the Government of Canada.  The only people who benefit from this confusion are lawyers.  Find a passing bill, and tack on a short amending provision that says something like “unless set out elsewhere, community buildings and infrastructure are the property of the band government”.
  8. Not all businesses behave well and there is a need for consequences.  There is a lack of teeth in the ability of First Nations governments to enforce their own laws because the maximum fines they can levy are far too small – just 1000 dollars for many matters. That could easily be amended with a few short lines to up to 10 or perhaps 50 or something like 100 thousand for environmental offences. 
  9. All governments know how important good infrastructure is to economic growth. It is often a centrepiece of their economic gameplans. One of the biggest obstacles to catching up on badly needed infrastructure is that both Indigenous governments and my old department usually work on a pay-as-you-go, all cash, basis with very little use of other financing tools.  The federal government could spin off a new Crown Corporation by 2021 – a First Nations Infrastructure Corporation – modelled on the one in BC, one that has the entire toolkit to tap into financial and capital markets, a board with a First Nations majority, and a relentless focus on building things.  If we can’t get political buy in for a national one, then set up some regional ones and build experience.  At the same time let’s rapidly scale up the use of the First Nations Finance Authority, which has proven it works.
  10. there is a great opportunity for Indigenous entrepreneurs to grow big scale businesses that operate and maintain buildings for others – whether they are housing or community facilities. Because these buildings wear out roughly twice as fast on reserve as off reserve it takes twice as much money to maintain the stock. We need a few First Nations owned companies modelled on Brookfield to take the risk and administrative load off small band governments, extend asset life and improve environmental performance.
  11. to First Nations leaders I would say there are two thorny problems that impede economic development that the Government of Canada cannot tackle – you are the only ones who can. It will take time and require a lot of political courage. One is overlapping assertions of Aboriginal title, which is pretty much all of them.  These are familiar in British Columbia, where I think we have to admit after thirty years of well meaning effort that the BC Treaty Commission has essentially failed to find a way to deal with overlapping claims. Every time a modern treaty was reached it was litigated by the neighbours, in front of Canadian courts.  We need a dispute resolution panel based on international relations practice that will arbitrate overlapping assertions or mediate co-management and sharing agreements. The AFN could take the lead in consulting and designing such a panel and make a proposal by June of 2021.
  12. The other is land tenure and land allocation within reserves.  This is a subject no one wants to talk about. Back in 1951 the Government of the day tried to increase security of tenure for individuals without breaking the common property model and moving to the fee simple model.  In many parts of the country people began to use certificates of possession, while in others there are various forms of custom allocation. The result sixty eight years later is all too often a mess, and one that not only holds back economic development but will over time create growing division and inequality within communities.  No federal government is ever going to grasp this nettle. The AFN should set up its own Land Reform Commission and make a proposal by 2022 on how to update the land tenure legislation that underpins all those communities yet to achieve full self government, starting with an overhaul of the certificate of possession regime.

And of course, there are many more pragmatic things that can be done to address access to capital, to build a skilled workforce and to grow more entrepreneurs and business leaders.  I can’t touch on them all.  You have sone very qualified people coming up later in this conference.

I am quite sure some people may not like some or indeed any of my proposals. Fair enough. Make your own. I know from experience some people will argue I am just making a more comfortable Indian Act and we should wait for a bigger reform – but I would say after nearly seventy years it is time to fix what can be fixed and move on from there.

What I really hope you will take away is a message of optimism and a greater sense of ambition. That there is ample common ground for an agenda of economic reconciliation. That there is no reason for it to be derailed by partisan politics or minority Parliaments. 

After 34 years on this road, my core belief is that what we call Indigenous Issues can and will yield to good policy, good governance, and good administration. Relentless pragmatic changes, one step at a time. will take us further along the path to a much brighter future.

People have earned the right to a sense of scepticism. Trust can be difficult to build and is quick to crumble. But pessimism and defeatism It is not what Canada is all about. Not in 2020. Not ever.

Thank you. Merci, Nakurmik. Meegweetch.

Explain like I’m Five Episode 10: The Phoenix Pay System, with Auditor General Michael Ferguson

The 2020 Network

“Another recommendation about another policy or another procedure – is that really going to solve this? That’s my biggest concern. I fundamentally feel that there is something more cultural at play that allowed Phoenix to happen.”

Canada’s Auditor General Michael Ferguson joins host Aaron Reynolds to explain the role of the Auditor General and what went wrong with the Phoenix pay system.
 

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Canada 2020 Policy Lab: Open Banking in Canada

Open Banking Policy Lab

Canada 2020 will be hosting a Policy Lab on Open Banking on Wednesday, May 7th 2018 in the Canada 2020 Studio Space in Ottawa.

On May 7th, Canada 2020 is convening a full-day session on Open Banking – an idea proposed in Budget 2018 by Finance Minister Bill Morneau. While still in its infancy, the idea has the potential to radically transform the banking sector by increasing a consumer’s access to their own financial data across platforms and institutions.
The Canada 2020 Policy Lab will help us think through a number of issues and opportunities surrounding Open Banking, with particular emphasis on:

  • What are the most important regulatory bottlenecks slowing growth of the FinTech sector? Would a move towards open banking help address these bottlenecks?
  • Should Canada develop and implement rules similar to the European Union’s Payment Service Directive (PSD2)?
  • Does the government need a national open banking strategy? If so, what should be in it?

To learn more about Canada 2020 Policy Labs, click here.
To apply to be a part of the Canada 2020 Policy Lab on Open Banking, click below:
 

The Canada 2020 Policy Lab

Policy Lab

Better Public Policy Through Collaboration

Canada 2020 Policy Labs are collaborative sessions deployed on emerging public policy issues that require creative thinking, across and outside of the traditional silos of policy development. Their intent is to leave the politics behind, by creating an open space for sharing information and perspectives.

 
What is a Policy Lab?
A Canada 2020 Policy Lab is a half-day or full day-long retreat at the Canada 2020 Studio in Ottawa, Ontario. The goals of a Policy Lab are to make connections between the participants, to share information and resources, and to make progress on complex public policy issues affecting Canadians.
Policy Lab Process
Prior to the lab, 20-60 relevant subject matter experts are invited to participate.
Each participant is encouraged to submit a resource list of publicly available materials: reports, news articles, videos, etc. that they feel are relevant to the topic. These will be compiled into a master resource list, which will be distributed to all participants a week before the Lab.
Participants may also submit additional perspectives, which will be distributed to all participants a week before the Policy Lab. A week before the Policy Lab, a schedule of the day’s activities will be released to all participants, along with a final list of questions that will be discussed.
Policy Lab Outcomes 
A short summary document will be written by Canada 2020, which details what was discussed, points on which there was consensus, points where there was disagreement, and recommended next steps.
At the end of the Policy Lab, the resource list will be made available to the public.
A successful Policy Lab should lead to further exploration of a topic by participants or Canada 2020 – through original research, stakeholder meetings, larger conferences or events, or public engagement.
Each Policy Lab will have spots reserved to the public. You can tell us why you think your input would be valuable to the discussion by filling out an online questionnaire. Applications will be specific to Policy Labs and will be posted on Canada 2020’s website.

Upcoming Canada 2020 Policy Labs

  • Canada 2020 Policy Lab on Open Banking in Canada (May 7th, 2018) – Open Banking Report on Findings and Resolutions
  • Canada 2020 Policy Lab on the National Pharmacare Initiative (May 29th, 2018) – report coming soon
  • Canada 2020 Policy Lab on Tax Competitiveness (June 19th, 2018) – report coming soon

 

Privacy Protection in the Federal Public Service

Introduction

In one single day, the 23rd of March 2015, the privacy protection issue in the Federal Public Service was under the spotlight, for two reasons: the Ottawa Citizen headlined that complaints relating to the weakness of the security measures protecting personal information in the Federal Government had reached a never-before-seen record, and the CBC as well as Radio-Canada disclosed new Edward Snowden revelations questioning the legality of gathering of personal information by the   Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC).
As is the case for all other institutions, privacy protection in the Federal Public Service in the digital age has become an unprecedented challenge, in its importance as well as in its nature. Even experienced managers find themselves unequipped to deal with the convergence of two towering phenomena: an information technology that is wreaking havoc with all traditional patterns of data protection, and a public security environment that calls for the collection and analysis of personal information at an unprecedented rate. The coupling of totally new data collection capacity with a new interest for it, forces a questioning of the acquired schemes of protection, and development of new measures in this area.
Beyond the technical measures required by these new information technologies, the Federal Public Service must update its policies relating to privacy protection so they reflect the unique challenges of these technologies. If no corrective legislative measures are taken — there is no real appetite — the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) becomes the main source of standards for privacy protection in a digital environment. I propose five main steps, which result from observations I made during the time I managed the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) over almost six years. I start with the main challenges found by OPC studies within the Federal Public Service and that resulted from the arrival of digital technologies:

  1. Management of new information technologies’ vulnerabilities
  2. Definition of personal information in the digital environment;
  3. Debate on the storage of personal information in the cloud;
  4. Differential repercussions of the Internet on the need for public transparency and privacy requirements; and,
  5. Emerging challenges.

 
I will treat them separately in order to define the issues, and propose policy directions for the protection of personal information.

Management of New Information Technologies Vulnerabilities

One can summarize the risks affecting personal information protection brought on by the arrival of new information technologies in the Federal Public Service, as is happening everywhere else, as follows: i) their complexity is such that it overwhelms the common abilities of employees and senior staff, ii) these technologies collect data on such small devices that the best controls can miss them, and on such powerful devices that if the data is lost, the private life of thousands of individuals can be compromised in one fell swoop, iii) the virtual mode of access of these technologies complicates the control over this access, and iv) permanent files created, correctly or erroneously, have massive dissemination possibilities, appropriate or not.
Through all these violations to privacy protection, especially in relation to the digital environment, I saw these risks materialize around four constants: i) the small size and the enormous complexity of the devices became increasingly challenging because of insufficient employee digital training; ii) governance structure is incomplete relative to the realities of the risks; iii) protection from indiscretion is lacking, and iv) new technologies are adopted without proper assessment of the risks involved.
To illustrate the lack of digital literacy, an employee left a USB key uncoded on the desk of a colleague, without any physical protection, thinking that a USB key was more secure than an e-mail. To this day, the USB key is missing. It contained medical information concerning approximately 6,000 individuals. In another case, a lack of digital literacy caused an employee to record on his electronic organizer the reason for a meeting with another employee (for disciplinary action), unaware that the content of his organizer could be read by 17 people who, by the way, knew the employee.
This lack of literacy is due to governance weakness, which does not ensure proper training of employees before letting them use information technology devices.
These incomplete structures of governance have been found in studies by the OPC, even in the case where departments run excellent personal data protection policies. Simply put, these policies were not accompanied by an efficient implementation mechanism. For example, movable devices were not identified, or registered, or entrusted to anyone. With no one responsible, protection of the devices was totally lacking. The devices that contained personal data were lost and never found because there was no mechanism to protect them, hence to find them, or at least to permit tracing of persons responsible for the protection of these devices.
This lack of protection from indiscretion is also quite frequent: the studies of the OPC, from 2008 to 2014, have uncovered the severity of the problem within the public service as well as in the private sector. In the Federal Public Service, we witnessed employees searching in the medical records of a former lover, employees distributing tax returns of celebrities, or accessing tax returns of new lovers and their family. Even if these indiscretions are quite rare, they reveal the systemic weaknesses that make them possible: access authorizations are too wide, controls such as journaling and reviewing are insufficient.
We already know that the main differential repercussion of the digital environment is the following: the smallest mistake can cause enormous damage. For example, a file that really got my attention made me write in 2012 “Ten Thing HR Professionals Need to Know“. It was a case whereby a Director General had her abilities assessment mistakenly sent to 321 colleagues. The mistake being: someone has hurriedly pressed on the button without even being aware of the consequences of the act, furthermore, the department had not restricted the distribution through e-mail of human resources information. The result was: the humiliation of the person and the damage to her reputation. It also triggered an inquiry by the OPC. I would venture to add, along with the damages to the person: the loss of employee confidence in the management of personal information in the department.
How can these blunders be avoided? My recommendations are in “Ten Tips” regarding the digital environment:

  • Avoid sharing sensitive information electronically, even though it is the current method of communication for all other types of communications;
  • Continuously ensure that the technology is mastered by the employee before handing it to him as a working tool, and test the capabilities of the person using it; and,
  • Develop a regime of access authorizations, as restrictive as possible while preserving the functionality of the organization, and support this regime by establishing a journaling process, and regularly review the access data it contains.

 
However, the complexity of information technologies does not affect employees exclusively. Higher level management in the public service, economy and political science experts, do not necessarily have the reflex of owning, as they should, the issue of their privacy protection on new technologies devices. This is what the 2010 audit of the OPC concluded on the use of wireless technologies within five Federal entities.  Those entities had all adopted those technologies and none had implemented an adequate risk assessment. The expected consequences occurred: the employees did not protect their devices through a solid password, the devices were not kept in a safe place, and the adequate protection policies had not been established because the risk had not been determined. I believe, however, that this complacency has now been replaced with greater acknowledgment of the risk, especially since the loss of a hard drive at Employment and Social Development Canada containing the financial data of some 600,000 individuals.
My recommendations in this regard were part of the Special Report of Inquiry relating to this incident and submitted to Parliament on March 25, 2014. Briefly, they were:

  • Protection of personal data in the digital environment should be addressed as an ecosystem of interacting components, i.e., physical, technological, administrative and employee security checks, including the digital literacy needed to handle those work tools.
  • Protection of personal data must be considered as being an institutional issue and not as a distinct and separate issue, that is, of the exclusive domain of the administrators of information technologies or of the office of access to information and privacy. Its implementation must be accompanied by a governance structure that:
    • Reflects the accountability regime established by the Privacy Act, which defines the attribution of this responsibility to the very senior public servants within an organization ; and
    • Insures that the necessary supervision imposed by the Act is present at all levels in order to abide by this regime of personal information protection.

Definition of Digital Personal Information

Internet has challenged the established definitions of both the “personal information” and the private sphere. Two notions that have been challenged in the last while within the Federal Public Service: the privacy aspect, or not, of the Internet subscriber’s data and the IP address, as well as free or protected access to personal accounts on the social networks.

1. Personal Data on the Internet

The question as to whether proprietorship of IP (Internet Protocol) addresses (name, address and other identifiers of the subscriber) or personal data, do or do not constitute personal data, was pressing in the last few years as regards the many successive bills that would have allowed access to these data by the executive and security authorities without court approval. Much of the argument touched on two different contradictory understandings: one concluded that the IP address and personal data, and the relevant personal data of a subscriber, do not carry more value than a phonebook, and that the absence of such a phonebook for Internet cannot determine the judicial statute of the data. The other, of which I approve, said that the subscriber’s data contained in the IP address of the subscriber constitutes a key to the subscriber’s interiority by giving access to his Internet searches – i.e., his areas of interest, his worries or his allegiances – and, consequently, should be considered a static and limited data of a physical address and a phone number.
In June 2014, in its decision re. R. v. Spencer, the Supreme Court ended the debate: it declared that the subscriber’s data in the IP address, allowing access to the Internet searches, is so revealing as to constitute protected personal data, to which the controlling forces can only have access after court authorization.
The consequences for the Federal Public Service are mostly felt within the RCMP and CSIS, but they also have a wider reach: the Privacy Act has just been modified to include, within the interpretation of personal information, the name to which the IP belongs.
Consequently, the federal institutions have to abide by the following constraints:

  • The subscriber’s data in the IP address, or the IP address that can lead to the identification of the subscriber, can only be collected if there is a direct link with the programs or activities of the institution ; and,
  • These data must be obtained through their owner, unless that constrains the use for which these data are intended (for example, a police inquiry).

 
The analytical framework of the OPC  A Matter of Trust: Integrating Privacy and Public Safety in the 21st Century,  published in 2010, gives the four steps of applicable considerations for integration within the measures of public security, of the relative obligations towards privacy protection. They also apply to a regime of access to personal data on Internet:

  • Establishing the legitimacy of the measure on the base of empirical data, which proves its necessity, its proportionality and its efficiency compared to the need and absence of less intrusive alternatives;
  • Implementation of security measures in order to protect data gathered and used legitimately;
  • Development of an internal governance framework that ensures conformity with these security measures; and,
  • Development of an external and internal supervision framework that ensures the accountability of the organization in regard to its duties regarding privacy protection.

 
Therefore, privacy protection is not a hindrance to the carrying out of the main duty of Canada’s government, i.e., to protect the security of its population. It rather provides an implementation framework that protects fundamental freedoms as well as personal security.

2. Access to Personal Accounts on Social Networks

The right of access, or not, of federal institutions to the personal accounts of individuals has been contested in at least two major cases of the OPC: a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) of the factors involved in the private life of a program that would have allowed the surveillance of accounts on public servants’ social networks in order to control their political activities, and a study on the surveillance by two departments of the Facebook account of an activist.
In the PIA’s case, OPC’s reaction had a sobering effect on the project: it violates Section 4 of the Privacy Act, as there is no direct link between the project and the activities or programs of the institution. Even if public servants are mandated, in different capacities, to stay away from political demonstrations and the public service is entitled to ensure that this rule is obeyed, the wide gathering of data inherent to the surveillance of the accounts on social networks would have widely exceeded what was deemed necessary in order to ensure that these restrictions to partisan activities are respected.
The project has been vehemently criticized by the upper echelons of the public service following the comments of the OPC, nevertheless, it constitutes an illustration of the consequences such straying can have on the digital surveillance ability without a framework.
One other illustration of this phenomenon was noted in a study by the OPC in 2013. An activist alleged that two departments had gathered her personal information from her Facebook account. None of the departments denied it. However, both said that they had not broken the Privacy Act, as Facebook accounts are in the public domain, hence, the information appearing there is also public and not protected by the Act.
The OPC rejected this argument: the information available does not lose its personal confidentiality just because it is available on Internet. The information still belongs to an identifiable person and is destined to selected people, not the government. And if there is no direct link with the department’s program or activities, it remains out of bounds for the department in question.
The study highlights the uncertainty stemming from the legal status of personal information deliberately posted on Internet. In order to clarify this legal status and the obligations of international institutions in this regard, the Special Report of the OPC to Parliament on January 28, 2014, Checks and Controls: Reinforcing Privacy Protection and Oversight for the Canadian Intelligence Community in an Era of Cyber-Surveillance recommends:

  • Regulating access to sources of open personal information sources accessible to the public; and,
  • Developing outlines defining specifically the gathering, use and dissemination of personal information on line and on social media sites.

 
This recommendation remains valid … and awaits implementation.

Hosting Personal Information in the Cloud

The commitment of governments towards protection of data on Internet has caused some to ask for the government to have its data hosted on its territory. In practice, this excludes government institutions from financial and functional benefits of the cloud because suppliers of cloud computing are mostly Americans. Edward Snowden revelations in June 2013 have increased mistrust to the point where governments that had planned a loosening of these rules had to backtrack.
The Government of Canada has, wisely, not imposed hosting of electronic data in Canada. However, the Canada Revenue Agency reserves the right to allow, or not to allow, the storing of accounting and financial information outside of Canada. The increasing use of cloud computing casts a doubt on the pertinence of this rule, which has, at least, to be explained within the cloud computing environment.
British Columbia and Nova Scotia governments require their institutions to store their data within Canada, except for a few conditions, excluding or complicating the use of cloud computing. I think that the residency requirement of the electronic data in Canada, with all its good intentions, weakens the security of personal data because it eliminates a particularly secure platform for hosting data: the dependable supplier of cloud computing.
I will now move to the strategic factors that should guide Federal institutions for converting to cloud computing.

1. Benefits and Risks of Cloud Computing

A policy paper published jointly by the OPC, the Office of the Information and Privacy  Commissioner of Alberta and the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, and a Fact Sheet authored by the OPC, describe the benefits and risks of data stored by cloud computing hosts: in its favour, cloud computing is an on-demand Internet service that does not require the user to have his own technological infrastructure, allowing for “on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service”. As a result, the user saves money, benefits from a lighter management load, improved efficiency, and the supplier being dependable, enjoys greater security of the data because it is handled by professionals. In this regard, OPC clarifies:

“For businesses that are considering using a cloud service, cloud computing could offer better protection of personal information compared with current security and privacy practices. Through economies of scale, large cloud providers may be able to use better security technologies than individuals or small companies can, and have better backup and disaster-recovery capabilities. Cloud providers may also be motivated to build privacy protections into new technology, and to support better audit trails.”

In stating the potential risks of cloud computing, the OPC refers to physical distance of the data hosting locales, the multiplicity of clients of the supplier, the possible misuse of the data, i.e., using them for other ends than what they were gathered for, and, because of the low cost of storage, the keeping of excessive amounts of data.
The OPC concludes that, in regard to the implementation of cloud computing, “Privacy is not a barrier, but it has to be taken into consideration.”
One can summarize as follows the relevant factors the Federal Government should consider when implementing cloud computing:

  • How is the existing infrastructure improved if cloud computing is adopted?
  • Which data can be stored in the cloud, and according to what criteria?
  • How would users of government services know that the data is in the clouds?
  • Is the cloud supplier dependable, certified ISO/IEC 27018 in privacy protection in cloud computing?

 
This brings me to the perfect combination: one where technological security of cloud computing by renowned suppliers pairs with a contractual mechanism that ensures conformity with certified ISO/IEC/ 27018 cloud computing security.

2. The ISO/IEC 27018 Standard for Privacy Protection in Cloud Computing

The OPC acted upon its beliefs concerning cloud computing: for a long while, the Office provided its expert advice for the development of standard ISO/IEC 27018 Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for protection of personally identifiable information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors, adopted on April 25th, 2014.
This standard increases dramatically the security of personal information in the cloud by creating a security certification base that combines the supplier’s technological strength with a framework that ensures that the conformity is really solid: by contract, the observance of which is checked through audits, the client organization using cloud computing keeps its control over the data and the supplier cannot use it for any other purpose than that defined by the client. Moreover, the supplier must support the client in respecting his own legal obligations. Finally, the obligations of the cloud computing supplier are subject to audit by the client as well as by the certifying organization, to ensure the level of adequacy. To be certified, the supplier must implement all the security measures required by Standard ISO/IEC/ 27018. Not only does a supplier that does not respect the standard lose his clientele, he also loses his certification.
How is this normative development relevant to the Canadian Public Service? It allows, at lower cost, a maximal protection of personal data by storing it in the most sophisticated technological infrastructures, as per the most efficient and demanding governance model. Standard government institutions are being asked more frequently to share their data beyond Canada’s borders and to hire suppliers that would enhance the efficiency of their services, when they do not possess the required resources to be able to render these services. The ISO/IEC 27018 Standard is universal and is accepted by the various players in the transborder flow of data.
Following the recommendations of the OPC, the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) has published, in the framework of its policies of information management, the document Privacy Matters: The Federal Strategy to Address Concerns About the USA Patriot Act and Transborder Data Flows, as well as the Guidance Document: Taking Privacy into Account Before Making Contracting Decisions. These documents should now be supplemented by the ISO/IEC 27018 Standard. But first, let’s have a look at the ISO Standards.
ISO, International Standardization Organization, and IEC, International Electrotechnical Commission, constitute the specialized system of international standardization. Both have members, states, institutions and experts. They are at the heart of the certification of compliance to some ISO standard by an accredited organization to do so. (Rewrite.) Certification is maintained, or revoked, following regular audits.
TBS already uses the universal standards, the ISO Standards. For example, the TBS Standards for the geospatial standard is based on the implementation of ISO Standards 19115 and 19128. The ISO/IEC 27018 Standard would be the perfect and most comprehensive contractual model in order to implement the conversion of federal institutions to certified cloud computing, thus achieving economies of scale and greater data security.
Avoiding cloud computing is obsolete, adopting it without guidance would be irresponsible. The adoption of the ISO/IEC 27018 Standard by TBS would show other Federal institutions the way towards secure cloud computing for personal data according to universally recognized settings.

Balance Between Public Transparency and Privacy

The legislative framework defining the balance between transparency and privacy is based on the complementarity of the Privacy Act (PA) and the Access to Information Act (AIA). Section 19 of the AIA bridges the gap between transparency and privacy. It forbids a public servant in charge of a Federal institution from communicating documents that would contain personal information as defined by the Privacy Act, i.e., information relating to an identifiable person. Three exceptions: the identifiable person agrees to this communication; the public already has access to the information; or, the AIA allows for a special case communication.
The weakness here stems from the fact that the disclosure imperatives emanate from principles that rival in strength the fundamental right to privacy in relation to administrative tribunals since Internet became public. In reality, I am of the opinion that transparency of judicial tribunals must be reviewed within the framework of the differential consequences of Internet. But judicial tribunals are not part of the Federal Public Service. Administrative tribunals are, and are therefore subject to the Privacy Act.
The Federal Public Service has eleven administrative tribunals, of which four work regularly on personal data issues: Canada Agricultural Review Commission; Public Service Labour Relations Board; Human Rights Tribunal; and, Social Security Tribunal. The Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal also publishes decisions that contain personal and even very sensitive information, but they are subject to such disclosure restrictions that the tension between transparency and privacy is resolved within the legislative framework applicable to the tribunal. Furthermore, the other tribunals are proceeding quite cautiously towards a resolution of the natural tension between transparency and privacy.
In 2009, the OPC published, jointly with its provincial and territorial counterparts, a Guidance Document Electronic Disclosure of Personal Information in the Decisions of Administrative Tribunals. The incentive to act came from an observation of real cases of differential consequences of Internet on the materialization of the transparency principle. It is worth noting that, in the Internet environment, the transparency principle does not give prominence to the tribunal, although it is subject to the principle that ensures its impartiality; it gives it to the parties whose identity is of no public interest. The massive and permanent distribution of this information can unjustly damage the parties’ reputation and would cause them to lose all hope of finding work due to such an insignificant cause. And this hinders the access to justice, due to the fact that complainants decide not to exercise their rights, fearing loss of reputation due to the Internet posting of their cause.
The Guidance Document of the Canadian Commissioners of Privacy is based on Section 8 of the Privacy Act, which restricts the communication of personal information without the consent of the concerned individual, except in very rare exceptions that seldom apply to the decisions of administrative tribunals. In summary, here are the proposed parameters, subject of course to the specific rules applicable to each tribunal:

  • Employees of the tribunal should inform the parties, as soon as a recourse has been filed, of the risks relating to privacy and what the safeguard measures are, and encourage the parties not to disclose more personal information than what is strictly needed;
  • The decisions should not divulge any identifier, directly or indirectly. Transparency applies to the reasoning of the tribunal and not to the parties. For example, names should be replaced with initials and addresses deleted or generalized. ISO/IEC 27018 becomes crucially important in the transborder flow of data and the outsourcing services;
  • The decision might contain an identifier when, in accordance with Section 8 (2) m) of the Privacy Act, it is in the public interest to publish the parties’ identities (for example, in criminal or fraud cases);
  • The tribunal would develop criteria to exercise its discretion in the application of the public interest concept.

 
This discretion is an absolute necessity for personal security reasons (a plaintiff contesting her disability pension was threatened by thugs who, having seen the tribunal decision on Internet, knew her address, the amount and payment date of her pension), but also for reasons relating to reputation and financial integrity (two complainants couldn’t find employment for ten years because any Internet search concerning them revealed their grievance).
The TBS must pick up after the OPC and issue policies aimed at re-establishing a fair relation between public transparency and privacy for administrative tribunals in the digital era.

Conclusion: Emerging Challenges

I summarized, from the start, the actual and important challenges that face the Federal Public Service in relation to privacy protection, and the double effect of two fundamental transformations in our means of communication: the arrival of new, complex, powerful and vulnerable information technologies; as well as the increase in cyber-surveillance capacity in a public security environment largely dependent on personal information.
The growing number of new security technologies is clearly moving ahead, mainly in one direction: risk assessment is being refined and multiple technological restrictions are being used following the risk analysis. New applications, like information hubs, where information management is centralized but respects the separation of the different databases, abide by the Act in this regard.
However, the limits of Internet surveillance in a free and democratic society have yet to be defined in view of its progress as well as the evolution of risks concerning physical security.
Privacy protection challenges to Internet surveillance are at the heart of the relationship between the citizens and the state. Section 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights illustrates eloquently this essential character of the right to privacy by declaring:

“Section 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Brought ahead in the debate on Bill C-13, the current Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, the issue of the legitimacy of Internet surveillance reappears in Bill C-51, whose short title is the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015. While the Bill traces the legislative process, it also highlights the manner in which the Internet surveillance capabilities force an upgrade of public service obligations towards privacy, i.e.:

  • Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects against unreasonable surveillance, which under the Privacy Act includes all gathering of data that have no relation to government programs or activities, which in turn includes the legitimate purposes of inquiry based on a reasonable suspicion, and individualized;
  • Restrictions that regulate the sharing of personal data between government agencies in order to avoid citizen profiling that produces new information beyond what has already been collected from the individual himself, and over and above the reason for which the data was gathered;
  • Natural justice principles of impartiality and accountability, specifically within Internet surveillance, which is meant to be secret and, thus, has to define its own form of accountability to the citizen.

 
The other double-edged sword of technological evolution resides in the analysis capabilities of data, leading to possible data mining.
As, on a smaller scale, the Census data supported, even anonymously, the government’s decisions at all levels, as well as the business decisions, according to demographic, social or economic movements, we therefore will have to develop an ethical framework for the analysis of Big Data that we store to draw conclusions for the greater good of the citizen. These data can improve the government’s services, refine decisions and adequately adapt the programs. Solutions seem to favour a governance framework based on anonymity, necessity and consent, i.e.:

  • When the public service develops efficient policies and programs and needs unidentified demographic data for census purposes, the Privacy Act does not forbid it, on the condition that an efficient anonymization process be applied. This would include the separation of data between demographic and nominative data that are pertinent in such a way as that the demographic data do not relate to an identifiable person, because the re-identification would be so difficult that it would become improbable.
  • For all nominative data needed by the operations of a public institution, Section 4 of the Privacy Act allows their gathering, and Section 7 allows for their compatible use.
  • If the Public Service needs to use personal data for other purposes than the ones that justified its gathering, even if it is in the public interest, it has to request and obtain the consent of the person concerned. For example, if a department wished to contact people for medical research purposes, it would have to explain the purpose of the research, how the personal data would be used, and ask if, in the interest of science, they would consent to this new use of their personal data.

 
These basic parameters show a general trend, insufficient, though, to settle the ethical challenge between reconciling privacy and public interest within the analysis of big data. This subject of conversation, like the one relating to Internet surveillance, must be raised more frequently, in order to ensure privacy protection within a new technological frame.
At this point, the priority of the public service should be to develop a normative framework that reflects what Canada considers to be legitimate in relation to the gathering and use of data in the digital age. In a certain way, Bill C-51 has provoked this debate, concerning both Internet surveillance and the analysis of personal data. But this debate is not what it should be: the die is cast, and the discussion is framed in a limited and political debate instead of within a social blueprint taking into account the real challenges, in a thoughtful and empirical manner.
That’s the next step we need to take in order to preserve privacy in the digital age, and it has become urgent.
 

Appendix

Chantal Bernier, Legal Counsel, Dentons Canada LLP, is a Senior Fellow at The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), University of Ottawa and Former Interim Privacy Commissioner of Canada. For more information, visit Dentons.com.

Blog: Five big ideas for Canada, but one is the biggest

This column was first published on the National Newswatch website on February 28, 2015



Last Thursday, Canada 2020 invited five thought leaders to Ottawa to give TED Talks on a Big Idea for Canada’s future. While I loved them all, for my money, one speaker stood out. No, it wasn’t astronaut Chris Hadfield, but a retired bureaucrat named Morris Rosenberg.
Rosenberg is a highly respected, former deputy minister of Justice, Health and, most recently, Foreign Affairs. He now heads the Trudeau Foundation. If his talk stood out, it was not because he is a smarter or more engaging speaker that the rest. (As a speaker, Hadfield beats them all, hands down.)
Rosenberg’s edge comes from his long experience as a deputy minister, whose job is to connect the machinery of government to the political leadership. This makes him an expert on the one issue that trumps all others: governance.
That was evident from his talk, which was peppered with terms like “complexity,” “collaboration,” “emergent properties,” and “risk-management.” Pretty wonkish stuff.
Especially when compared with, say, Tom Rand from MaRS, who argued passionately that climate change is the issue of our time. If we don’t get CO2 emissions under control, he warned, everyone on the planet is in serious trouble.
Now, the end of the world as we know it is a tough act to follow, but Rosenberg made a convincing case that one issue is more serious and urgent: a policy process that is foundering so badly that it can no longer even respond to such a threat.
According to Rosenberg, our governments were designed for a time when issues were thought to have clear boundaries and good solutions had well defined objectives.
That worked pretty well before globalization, the digital revolution and population explosion. Then suddenly the world shrank. Issues became way more interconnected and a lot more complex.
Today, an issue like climate change is not just an issue, but a diffuse constellation of issues that stretches out across policy space, linking the environment to transportation, urban planning, health, education, agriculture, Aboriginal issues and so on.
As a result, an effective strategy to address climate change must mobilize and align different departments, governments, members of the business and NGO communities, and even ordinary citizens. In a word, it requires collaboration.
Moreover, such issues are never “solved.” They are always with us, and always mutating. Good policy aims at managing them. And here we got a glimpse of what it must be like to be a deputy minister today.
That’s not what’s happening, said Rosenberg flatly. Politicians like issues that are clear and solutions that are permanent. They dislike processes with too many players in the field and too many links to other issues. It’s too easy for something to go wrong.
As a result, our politicians have become very reluctant to tackle Big Issues; and so the Big Ideas to solve the Big Issues rarely get beyond the testing stage.
You don’t have to read between the lines to get the point: A vicious circle has formed inside government where the riskiness of the policy process is making the leadership increasingly risk-averse—to the point where we are not even trying to develop the processes, skills and knowledge needed to respond, say, to the prospect of calamitous environmental change.
In short, governance is in big trouble and if we don’t fix it all the Big Ideas in the world will get us nowhere. To underline the point, let’s take a quick look at those proposed by the other four speakers, starting with Hadfield.
He made a convincing case that space travel is on the verge of a major breakthrough. Within a few years, reusable rockets could dramatically cut the cost of putting satellites into orbit.
That, says Hadfield, would revolutionize our use of these space technologies by making it cost-effective to use them for all kinds of purposes, such as extending internet service to the 60% of the world’s population that doesn’t yet have it.
As for Tom Rand, having made the case that with climate change we are sleepwalking our way to disaster, he contended that the only real solution is to put a price on carbon and use it to promote rapid development of alternative energy sources.
Jacline Nyman, President and CEO of the United Way, spoke movingly about the huge cost of poverty to Canadians. Not just in terms of the taxes to support social services, but the loss of human capital that comes with poverty. Wouldn’t it make more sense to have a strategy that invests in people, she asked?
Finally, Jennifer Keesmaat, the spirited Chief Planner from the City of Toronto, showed how the infrastructure needed to support suburban living is simply too costly to keep building. But with creative thinking and leadership, she claimed, it could be refurbished to transform how communities work and how people live.
All are inspiring ideas and worthy of deeper discussion and experimentation. But if Rosenberg is right, not one of them will be achieved without the right kind of political leadership, backed up by effective policy processes.
So here’s the big lesson I took away from Five Big Ideas for Canada: Leadership and process are two sides of the same coin. Good leadership must be supported by governance machinery that can turn a good idea into a good policy, and a good policy into a good initiative. Increasingly, we have neither.
We may have entered a new policy environment, but our political system is stuck in the past. The question now is: What are we going to do about it? Will we do anything at all?
Now that’s what I all a BIG ISSUE.



Dr. Don Lenihan is Senior Associate, Policy and Engagement, at Canada 2020. Don is an internationally recognized expert on democracy and Open Government. His recent projects include chairing an expert group on citizen engagement for the UN and the OECD; and chairing the Ontario Open Government Engagement Team. The views expressed here are his alone. Don can be reached at: [email protected] or follow him on Twitter at: @DonLenihan 

Public Service Renewal

Genuine renewal of the federal public service requires a new “moral contract” between the public service, ministers, and parliament in support of the values of a professional, non-partisan public service.
A new “moral contract” is required because the boundary between political and public service values has become blurred at the highest levels, a problem identified by the Gomery Commission, by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, by the political parties themselves, and by leading scholars. As recommended by numerous task forces, commissions and experts, a new “moral contract” should take the form of a Charter of Public Service, which both houses of parliament unanimously committed to establish, in 2005.
In this paper, Ralph Heintzman argues for the implementation of a Charter of Public Service, which will have at least four key pillars:

  1. the values and ethics of public service;
  2. strengthening the deputy minister’s role as accounting officer;
  3. reforming the process for the appointment of deputy ministers; and
  4. new rules for government communications.

The paper concludes with 29 specific policy recommendations. Download the paper in both French and English below.
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